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Abstract
In this paper, we construct a dynamic assignment model that can provide
a unified explanation of several observed features of persistent differences in
productivity, wages, skill mixes and profits between firms. Large organization
capital (high firm-specific knowledge) attracts skilled workers, who can create
further organization capital in the future. This positive feedback brings about
persistent differences in these variables. We also analyze how the real and
perceived values of a firm’s organization capital interactively influence persis-
tence. We estimate parameters and simulate the model. Our results show
that a positive assignment mechanism accounts for a large part of the observed
persistence.
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1 Introduction
Why are some firms persistently more productive than others? Evidence repeatedly
reveals that there are substantial and persistent differences in productivity between
plants and between firms [e.g., Baily et al. (1992)]. Apparently, productivity is not
the only variable that exhibits persistent differences. Evidence also shows that skill
compositions and wage payments exhibit persistent differences between firms [e.g.,
Haltiwanger et al. (2000)]. Moreover, persistent differences in profits are pervasive
[e.g., McGahan (1999)].
The coexistence of persistent differences in these variables is not coincidental.
Productive firms employ skilled workers and pay high wages [e.g., Haltiwanger et
al. (1999)]. In addition, skills and the market value of a firm are positively corre-
lated [Abowd et al. (2004)]. Evidence implies that the persistence of differences in
productivity, skills, wages and profits may have the same source.
Although economists pay it little attention, there is another well-known aspect
of productivity differences. In Table 1, future relative productivity is regressed
on present and past relative productivity; relative productivity is estimated by the
logarithm of labor productivity relative to an industry and year average. The table
shows that after controlling for current relative productivity, the sequence of past
relative productivity levels still influences future relative productivity. This means
that even a previously lower ranked firm that suddenly climbs up the ladder would
find it difficult to maintain its success in the future. That is, one-off large temporal
shocks are less likely to account for continuous success. To predict the movement
of future relative productivity, we need to know the history of relative productivity.
However, why does current relative productivity fail to summarize an influence from
its past? A useful theory of productivity differences must explain not only why
productivity differences persist between firms, but also why a firm’s history matters
for future persistence.
In this paper, we aim to provide a unified explanation for these findings. We
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The Dependent variable is D ln yt+1.
constant D ln yt D ln yt−1 D ln yt−2 D ln yt−3
-0.001 0.671∗∗ 0.134∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.002) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
# of observations 21154 Adjusted-R2 0.763
Table 1: AR 4
The variable, D ln yt, is the logarithm of labor productivity relative to an industry
average in year t. The variables are constructed from an industry annual dataset in
COMPUSTAT for the period from 1975 to 2004. Data construction is explained in
Appendix 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗ means significant at the 0.5
percent level.
develop a dynamic assignment model for the relationship between the skills of workers
and firm-specific knowledge, which we term a firm’s organization capital.1 We also
examine how the assignment model explains the observed evidence.
Two assumptions are emphasized: organization capital and skills are complemen-
tary to each other; and skill is an input for the accumulation of organization capital.
Because skill is complementary to organization capital, skilled workers are assigned
to firms with large organization capital. On the other hand, because skill is an input
for the accumulation of organization capital, the employment of skillful workers pro-
motes the accumulation of organization capital. Hence, the dynamics exhibit positive
feedback. We investigate the extent to which this positive feedback mechanism raises
the persistence of a firm’s organization capital. Given that the productivity, wages,
skill composition and profits of a firm are shown to be strictly increasing functions
of organization capital, the model can explain not only the persistence of these vari-
ables, but can also explain positive correlations between productivity, skills, wages
1More specifically, we define organization capital as all types of intangible assets embodied in
an organization. It might consist of organizational structure, daily practices, routines, information
held by an organization, corporate culture, reputation and so on.
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and profits.
The theory predicts that a rise in the heterogeneity of skills increases the persis-
tence of organization capital. When the variance of skills is high, the top organization
has the most advantages because it can attract the best workers who can provide the
firm with the best knowledge and promote the accumulation of organization capital.
Hence, the larger is the variance of skill, the longer the top organization can enjoy its
relative advantage. It is shown that when there are no idiosyncratic shocks, every
firm’s rank stays the same forever and firms’ relative advantages (and disadvantages)
persist indefinitely.
Although this simple logic can explain why productivity differences between firms
persist and why there are positive correlations between productivity, wages, skills and
profits, it cannot explain why current relative productivity fails to summarize the
influence of the past. In order to explain this evidence, we need a third assumption:
organization capital is unobservable. When organization capital is unobservable,
there is assignment between the quality of workers and perceived organization capital.
If a firm’s organization capital is believed to be high, this belief attracts skillful
workers, who provide the firm with better knowledge. Because the current belief
is constructed from past observations, historical observations can influence future
organization capital by changing perceptions about its current level. This mechanism
may explain why a firm’s history is important.
The model of unobserved organization capital has further theoretical and em-
pirical advantages. Theoretically, this extension allows us to analyze the dynamic
interaction between a firm’s real capacity and its perceived capacity. On the one
hand, when organization capital is believed to be high, this belief attracts skilled
workers who can develop superior knowledge in the firm. On the other hand, if ac-
tual organization capital is high, the firm’s current performance is likely to be good,
which generates the perception that the firm has a high level of organization capital.
Hence, we can analyze how this dynamic positive feedback between actual capacity
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and perceived capacity influences the persistence of productivity, skill mixes, wage
payments and profits.
In particular, we examine how the noisiness of information influences persistence.
Suppose that a firm’s current output reveals information about its organization capi-
tal. If the revealed information is noisy, managers learn little from the new observa-
tions, and thus do not change their beliefs drastically. If there is assignment between
these beliefs and the quality of workers, the quality of assigned workers changes little
and, therefore, so does accumulated actual organization capital. In particular, when
output has no predictive power for organization capital, the belief never changes. In
that case, we show that the firm’s rank remains the same on average forever and
that the dynamics of actual organization capital exhibit temporal deviations from
the constant belief.
Extending the model to incorporate unobserved organization capital has another
advantage. It allows us to structurally estimate the parameters of our model from
productivity dynamics. Exploiting this additional advantage, we differentiate two
sources of persistence — positive assortative assignment and noisy information — from
others by using an industry annual dataset from COMPUSTAT covering 1970 to
2004.
The estimated parameters are all significant and their signs are consistent with
theoretical predictions. In particular, our empirical results show that two-year lagged
relative wages have a positive impact on current relative productivity after controlling
for one- and two-year lags of relative productivity; note that, in this paper, “relative”
refers to the logarithm of each value relative to industry and year averages. This ev-
idence is consistent with the hypothesis that skilled workers help firms to accumulate
assets and raise future productivity. Our empirical results also show that perceived
relative productivity, which is constructed by using sequences of past relative pro-
ductivity, has a positive impact on future relative productivity. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that people learn about a firm’s capacity from its past perfor-
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mance and form beliefs that influence its employment of skilled workers and future
performance.
By using the estimated parameters, we simulate not only the autocorrelations
of relative productivity, relative wages and expected relative profits per worker, but
also the correlation between relative productivity and relative wages. All simulated
autocorrelations replicate the observed autocorrelations quite well. The model is
also able to explain the observed high correlations between relative productivity and
relative wages. That is, our model can quantitatively account for not only the
persistence of these variables, but also the high positive correlation between relative
productivity and relative wages.
We use our model to conduct two counterfactual experiments. They show that if
there were no skill difference between workers and, therefore, if there were no assign-
ment problem, firms’ relative advantages (disadvantages) would almost disappear in
about five years. In addition, the correlation between relative productivity and rela-
tive wages would diminish substantially, while even if output perfectly predicted the
level of organization capital, there is only a minor influence on variables’ persistence
and the correlation between relative productivity and relative wages . These exer-
cises consistently suggest that a positive assignment mechanism accounts for a large
part of the observed persistence of variables. The difficulty of estimating organization
capital plays only an auxiliary role.
It has long been recognized that an individual firm possesses particular resources
[e.g., Kaldor (1934), Robinson (1934) and Lucas (1978)]. As a source of its specific
resources, many economists emphasize the importance of firm-specific knowledge ac-
cumulated through experience [e.g., Penrose (1959) and Rosen (1972)]. Prescott
and Visscher (1980) refer to this accumulated specific knowledge as a firm’s organi-
zation capital. Recently, interest in organization capital has reemerged. Jovanovic
and Rousseau (2001), Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) and Samaniego (2006) quantify the
macroeconomic effects of organization capital. Faria (2003) explains merger waves
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by using a model of assignment between organization capital and skills. However,
no paper has addressed the question of why some firms succeed in accumulating
organization capital, whereas others do not. This is the main aim of this paper.
Unlike previous researchers, we model organization capital as a form of the vin-
tage human capital analyzed by Chari and Hopenhayn (1991). For any organization,
ancestors determine a particular routine, culture, organizational structure, set of
rules and how to arrange machines and structures that successors inherit and mod-
ify. Hence, the workers employed in the past influence the organization’s future.
This modeling strategy allows us to investigate how the assignment of workers to
organizations has long-run effects on organization.
Positive assortative assignment models also have a long history. Becker (1973)
originally derived a condition for positive assortative matching in a marital market.
Sattinger (1979) analyzed a positive assortative assignment equilibrium between phys-
ical capital and skills. More recently, economists have rediscovered the importance
of assignment models [e.g., Kremer (1993), Costrell and Loury (2004) and Shimer
(2005)]. However, in most papers, the distribution of assigned variables is treated as
given.
Notable exceptions are Acemoglu (1997) and Jovanovic (1998). Acemoglu (1997)
endogenizes the distribution of skills and physical capital and Jovanovic (1998) en-
dogenizes the distribution of skills and technology. Both authors examine persistent
income inequality. Unlike them, we endogenize the distribution of organization cap-
ital and examine persistent differences in productivity, skills, wages and profits.
A key assumption behind positive assortative matching is that organization capital
and skills are complementary. There is supporting evidence for this assumption.
Chandler (1977) reports historical evidence that the development of administrative
hierarchies is essential for monitoring and coordinating resources in modern business
firms. Chandler (1977) demonstrates that this organizational structure demands
skilled workers for processing information. Recent evidence obtained by Bresnahan,
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Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) shows that reorganization associated with IT investment
demands more skilled workers. For example, the use of flexible machinery often
requires workers to have greater discretion, which in turn requires them to have data
analysis skills and problem solving abilities.
Learning is another important feature of the model. As Jovanovic (1982) ex-
plains, a firm gradually learns its own productive capacity. However, unlike Jo-
vanovic (1982), we assume that a firm’s productive capacity is a product of its active
investment and is affected by uncertainty arising from that investment. Ericson and
Pakes (1995) incorporate similar dynamics for productive capacity. Hence, our model
can be seen as a hybrid of the passive learning model of Jovanovic (1982) and the
active investment model of Ericson and Pakes (1995).
Several models generate an equilibrium distribution of wages [e.g., Burdett and
Mortensen (1998)] and an equilibrium distribution of productivity [e.g., Eeckhout
and Jovanovic (2002)]. These researchers show how ex ante homogeneous agents can
generate ex post heterogeneity. Unlike them, we assume an ex ante heterogeneity of
skills and then generate distributions of organization capital, productivity, wages and
profits. An advantage of our approach is that our unique stationary distribution is
globally stable. Hence, our distribution is robust to disturbances.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we set up a dynamic
positive assortative assignment model under the assumption that organization capital
is perfectly observable. In this section, we clarify the mechanism through which skill
differences enhance persistence in the model. In Section 3, we extend the model
to incorporate the imperfect observation of organization capital. We analyze how
perceived capacity and actual capacity have interactive effects on persistence. In
Section 4, we discuss the identification of the parameters from the data and report
our empirical results. In Section 5, we simulate our model by using the estimated
structural parameters. In Section 6, we discuss extensions and conclude the paper.
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2 A Dynamic Assignment Model in which Orga-
nization Capital is Observable
In this section, it is assumed that organization capital is observable. We establish a
positive assortative assignment equilibrium between organization capital and skills.
The assumption that organization capital is observable is used to clarify the intuition
about how an assignment model can explain persistent differences in productivity,
wages, skills and profits. Our standard assignment model is based on that of Sat-
tinger (1979). We extend the model to incorporate dynamics by endogenizing the
distribution of organization capital.
The economy is represented by a continuum of workers and firms. The population
of both firms and workers is normalized to unity. Each firm has organization capital
of kot , and a set of jobs, the total mass of which is also normalized to unity. We
assume that the ith job in a firm that has organization capital of kot employs one
worker who has quality of qit and produces output of yit according the following
production function:
yit = A (k
o
t )
α qψit, α > 0,ψ > 0,
where A, α and ψ are constant parameters. Because the total mass of jobs is 1, we
interpret
R 1
0
yitdi as both a firm’s total output and its labor productivity.
Assume that the ith job pays competitive wages of w (ln qt). As discussed later,
the employment decision is made for each job and job supervisors are assumed to
maximize the profits made from the job. The profit maximization problem by the
managers in the ith job is written as
χi (ln k
o
t ) = argmax
ln qit
{exp [lnA+ α ln kot + ψ ln qit]− w (ln qit)} , ∀i, ln kot . (1)
We express wages and policy as functions of ln kot and ln qt to simplify the algebra.
Suppose that ln kot is normally distributed with a mean of µkt and a standard
deviation of σkt at the date t. Assume also that ln qt is normally distributed with a
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mean of µq and a standard deviation of σq at any date. For simplicity, we assume
that jobs and workers have reservation values of 0. Because the number of jobs is
the same as the number of workers, nobody chooses the outside option and every
agent can find a partner. Hence, these assumptions make it possible to focus on the
assignment problem.
We focus on the positive assortative equilibrium. This means that the top x
percent of ln kot is assigned to the top x percent of ln qt for any x. Let Φ (·) denote
the standard normal distribution. Given that ln k
o
t−µkt
σkt
and ln qt−µqσq are distributed as
standard normal variables, a positive assortative equilibrium implies that
1− Φ
µ
ln kot − µkt
σkt
¶
= 1− Φ
µ
χi (ln k
o
t )− µq
σq
¶
, ∀i, ln kot . (2)
Equations (1) and (2) characterize a static market equilibrium.
Definition 1 A market equilibrium with observed organization capital consists of
χi (·) and w (·) that satisfy equations (1) and (2).
We aim to find a policy function and a wage function that are consistent with this
definition of equilibrium. Equation (2) states that the policy function must satisfy
χ (ln kot ) ≡ χi (ln kot ) =
σq
σkt
[ln kot − µkt] + µq, ∀ ln kot .
Hence, all jobs in a firm are filled by workers of the same quality. This policy function
means that, in equilibrium, highly qualified workers must be assigned to a firm that
has a high level of organization capital. For this policy function to be consistent with
the definition of equilibrium, the policy function must solve equation (1). Consider
a firm that has organization capital of ln kot =
σkt
σq
£
ln qt − µq
¤
+µkt ≡ χ−1 (ln qt). For
all jobs in this firm, ln qt must be the optimal choice. Hence, marginal cost at ln qt
must be equal to the marginal product of ln qt, as follows:
w0 (ln qt) = ψy
¡
χ−1 (ln qt) , ln qt
¢
, ∀ ln qt,
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where y (ln kot , ln qt) = exp (lnA+ α ln k
o
t + ψ ln qt). Moreover, because the reserva-
tion value of workers is 0, w (−∞) = 0. The following wage function is derived from
the marginal condition and the boundary condition:
w (ln qt) =
ψσq
ασµ∞
y (χ−1 (ln qt) , ln qt)
1 + ψσqασµ∞
.
It is easy to check that the second-order condition is satisfied by this wage function.
Hence, the policy function and the wage function are consistent with the definition of
equilibrium. By construction, the equilibrium is unique. Note that wage payments
increase in ln qt, which is also an increasing function of ln kot . Hence, a firm that has
high organization capital pays high wages.
The firm’s profits are strictly increasing in ln kot .
π (ln kot ) =
Z 1
0
[y (ln kot ,χi (ln k
o
t ))− w (χi (ln kot ))] di =
y (ln kot ,χ (ln k
o
t ))
1 + ψσqασµ∞
.
Hence, labor productivity, the quality of workers, wage payments and profits per
worker are positively correlated, and if ln kot is persistent these variables are persis-
tent. To determine what influences the persistence of these variables, we analyze the
dynamics of ln kot below.
Dynamics: Following Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) and Samaniego (2006), we assume
that organization capital is acquired by learning by doing. In the spirit of Arrow
(1962), learning by doing is modeled as an unintended result of production.
More specifically, we assume that an individual worker cannot change a particular
routine or culture in a firm, but a group of workers can. Because top managers
cannot evaluate the qualities of individual workers, they must rely on evaluation by
supervisors in each job. Although supervisors can evaluate the quality of each worker
with respect to production in a particular job, they are unaware of how interaction
between individual workers can change the firm’s routines or culture. We implicitly
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assume that communication cannot perfectly resolve this issue. Because skilled
workers are likely to learn the mechanism of production well and have better ideas,
the employment of skilled workers has indirect external effects that are not initially
acknowledged.
We model this process by assuming that the average quality of employed workers
improves organization capital in the next period:2
kot+1 = B (k
o
t )
φ (qet )
γ eεt, 0 ≤ φ < 1, γ > 0, (3)
where qet =
R 1
0
qitdi, B, φ and γ are constant parameters and εt is a random variable,
which is normally distributed with a mean of−σ
2
ε
2
and a standard deviation of σε. The
parameter φ measures the technological persistence of organization capital. Because
some organization capital depreciates, we assume that a fraction, φ, of organization
capital can be carried over to the next period.
The assumption about learning by doing might be unreasonable if top managers’
talents are the most influential inputs for creating organization capital. When a firm
employs top managers, it expects them to change the firm’s structure and norms.
Hence, the firm’s maximization problem must also take into account equation (3).
In Appendix 2, we assume that a firm solves a dynamic optimization problem by
taking into account the dynamics of organization capital. It constructs a recursive
positive assortative equilibrium and examines its properties. This shows that the
dynamics of organization capital are the same as those obtained when one assumes
2Given that every job is filled by workers of the same quality, equation (3) generates dynamics
that are the same as those from the transition equation,
kot+1 = B1 (k
o
t )
φ1 (yt)
γ1 eεt ,
where yt = A (kot )
α qψt , and B1, ψ1 and γ1 are parameters. This equation implies that ln kot+1 is
expressed as a weighted sum of {ln yt−s}ts=0. As discussed by Bahk and Gort (1993), in empirical
studies, cumulative gross output is used as a proxy of experience accumulated through learning by
doing. Hence, our assumption is consistent with the standard learning-by-doing assumption.
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that there is learning by doing. Differences arise in the wage and profit functions.
We maintain the learning-by-doing assumption for three reasons. First, as con-
vincingly argued by Simon (1997) and Nelson and Winter(1982), it is reasonable to
assume that an individual in a firm would find it hard to change a firm’s routines
or culture. Second, the learning-by-doing assumption simplifies the model, but con-
veys the main logic of the paper. Hence, most of our analysis avoids the technical
difficulties associated with dynamic optimization problems. Third, the wage and
profit functions derived on the basis of the learning-by-doing assumption are use-
ful for our empirical work. We discuss the unique outcomes generated by the the
learning-by-doing assumption later.
Because all jobs in a firm are filled by workers of the same quality, in which case,
ln qt =
σq
σkt
(ln kot − µkt)+µq, in equilibrium, the dynamics of organization capital can
be written as
ln kot+1 = lnB + φ ln k
o
t + γ
∙
σq
σkt
(ln kot − µkt) + µq
¸
+ εt. (4)
Because ln kot and εt are normally distributed, ln k
o
t+1 is also normally distributed.
The dynamics of µkt and σ
2
kt can be derived from equation (4) as follows:
µkt+1 = lnB + φµkt + γµq −
σ2ε
2
, σkt+1 =
sµ
φ+
γσq
σkt
¶2
σ2kt + σ2ε.
These two equations characterize the dynamics of the aggregate state variables. By
using the dynamics of µkt, equation (4) can be rewritten as
ln kot+1 − µkt+1 =
µ
φ+
γσq
σkt
¶
(ln kot − µkt) + ε∗t ,
where ε∗t = εt+
σ2ε
2
is normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation
of σε. This equation implies that when ln kot is larger than its industry mean µkt, the
fraction, φ+ γσqσkt of this relative advantage is carried over to the next period. The pa-
rameter φ captures the assumed persistence, and the second term, γσqσkt , represents the
result of positive assortative assignment. When the ratio of the standard deviation of
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skills to that of organization capital is large, organization capital is more persistent.
When the ratio is large, the firm with the most organization capital derives the most
benefits because this leading firm attracts the most talented workers, who provide
the firm with the best knowledge. Therefore, relative advantages persist longer.
This intuitive result is analyzed more rigorously below. First, we show that the
distribution of ln kot converges to a stationary distribution.
Proposition 2 The mean, µkt, and standard deviation, σkt, of ln kot converge to the
stationary points, µk∞ and σk∞, respectively, where µk∞ and σk∞ are
µk∞ =
lnB + γµq −
σ2ε
2
1− φ , (5)
σk∞ =
γφσq +
q
(γσq)
2 +
¡
1− φ2
¢
σ2ε
1− φ2
. (6)
Moreover, when the distribution converges to the stationary distribution, the dynamics
of organization capital follow a first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) process, as follows:
D ln kot+1 =
µ
φ+
γσq
σk∞
¶
D ln kot + ε
∗
t , (7)
where D ln kot = ln k
o
t − µk∞.
The proposition states that there is a unique, globally stable stationary distrib-
ution. Hence, an economy converges to the stationary distribution in the long run.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss the dynamics of equation (7). Because
persistence is only influenced by φ+ γσqσk∞ , we refer to this as the persistence parameter
in what follows.
Persistence when σε = 0: In order to have a clear intuition, we first analyze a
deterministic model.
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Proposition 3 Suppose that σε = 0. Then, there is still a stationary distribution,
µk∞ =
lnB+γµq
1−φ , σk∞ =
γσq
1−φ , and the level of organization capital remains constant:
ln kot+1 = ln k
o
t .
The proposition states that, if there is no shock, the ranking of organization capital
is constant. When there are no idiosyncratic shocks, the top organization always
attracts the best workers, who, in turn, equip the firm with the best knowledge.
Hence, it remains at the top and maintains exactly the same level of organization
capital in the long run.
Note that σk∞ is not 0. Hence, organization capital varies between firms and so
too, therefore, do productivity, wages, skill mixes and profits. Because σq is always
positive, when σkt is small, the assignment effect,
γσq
σkt
, is large. Hence, a firm with
a high level of organization capital benefits substantially. This mechanism increases
σkt. Ultimately, σk∞ does not converge to 0.
Persistence when σε > 0. When we introduce idiosyncratic shocks into the accu-
mulation of organization capital, reversion to the mean occurs. Idiosyncratic shocks
make changes in rankings possible. A firm that receives a positive shock climbs
the rankings, which enables it to attract higher quality workers. This means that
top organizations cannot remain the best. Top organizations might slip down the
rankings.
Substituting equation (6) into the persistence parameter reveals that this para-
meter is a strictly increasing function of γσqσε .
φ+
γσq
σk∞
= φ+
1− φ2
φ+
r
1 +
¡
1− φ2
¢ ³γσq
σε
´−2 ∈ (φ, 1) , (8)
d
³
φ+ γσqσk∞
´
dγσqσε
> 0, lim
γσq
σε →∞
µ
φ+
γσq
σk∞
¶
= 1, lim
γσq
σε →0
µ
φ+
γσq
σk∞
¶
= φ.
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When σε > 0,
γσq
σε
is finite. Therefore, the persistence parameter is always less than
1. This means that equation (7) is covariance stationary. Hence, the dynamics
exhibit reversion to the mean and eventually initial advantages disappear. In this
case, it is easy to show that
ρln kj ≡
E
£
D ln kotD ln k
o
t−j
¤
σ2k∞
=
µ
φ+
γσq
σk∞
¶j
.
That is, the larger the persistence parameter, the larger is the autocorrelation. Hence,
an increase in γσqσε raises the autocorrelation.
Two remarks are worth making. First, the parameter γσqσε represents the impor-
tance of skill variation relative to the reshuffling effect. Hence, the importance of skill
variation to persistence is not absolute. Small skill variations can induce substantial
persistence in variables when an industry is stable. Second, when γσqσε is infinite, the
persistence parameter converges to unity. Hence, the results in Proposition 3 can be
seen as the limit of this general case.
3 A Dynamic Assignment Model in which Orga-
nization Capital is not Observable
In the previous section, we provided a clear intuition about how assignment influ-
ences the persistence of variables and explained why productivity, skills, wages and
profits are positively correlated. However, our analysis did not explain how historical
relative productivity influences future relative productivity. Because the dynamics
of organization capital in the previous section were represented by an AR(1) process,
once we control for a current value, past values do not influence future ones.
In this section, we examine the same dynamic assignment model but incorporate
organization capital that is not observable. We show that past organization capi-
tal can influence future organization capital even when current organization capital
is controlled for. We also analyze how perceived organization capital and actual
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organization capital have interactive effects on the persistence of capital.
Assume that kot cannot be directly observed, but can be inferred from the realiza-
tions of output. To capture this idea, we add a firm-specific idiosyncratic shock to
the production function for each job as follows:
yit = e
utA (kot )
α qψit, α > 0,ψ > 0, (9)
where ut is normally distributed with a mean of −σ
2
u
2
and a variance of σ2u.
When employment decisions are made about the ith job, output is not realized.
Hence, a decision must be based on a conditional expectation given the prior belief
about the level of organization capital. We assume that the prior distribution of ln kt
is normally distributed with a mean of µkt and a variance of σ
2
kt. Then the expected
output from the job is
E [yit|µkt, ln qit] = exp
µ
lnA+ αµkt +
α2σ2kt
2
+ ψ ln qit
¶
. (10)
Similarly to the previous section, all firms are assumed to have the same σkt at date t.
However, we deviate from the previous section by assuming that the belief, µkt, differs
between firms. Given that all agents in an economy receive the same information,
these agents hold the same beliefs about a firm’s organization capital. That is, the
belief, µkt, characterizes a firm’s position in the economy. It is assumed that the
belief, µkt, is normally distributed with a mean of µ
e
kt and a standard deviation of
σµt. We examine a positive assortative assignment equilibrium between a belief, µkt,
and a skill, ln qt.
Similarly to the previous problem, by assuming that the wage is a function of
ln qt, wˆ (ln qt), we can define a market equilibrium as follows.
Definition 4 A market equilibrium with unobserved organization capital consists of
a χˆi (·) and a wˆ (·) that satisfy the following two equations:
χˆi (µkt) = argmax
ln qit
{E [yit|µkt, ln qit]− wˆ (ln qit)} , ∀i, µkt. (11)
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1− Φ
µ
µkt − µekt
σµt
¶
= 1− Φ
µ
χˆi (µkt)− µq
σq
¶
, ∀i, µkt. (12)
Applying the same logic used in the previous section, we can derive a policy
function and a wage function that are consistent with this definition of equilibrium.
Because the derivation is as before, the proof of the following theorem is omitted.
Theorem 5 There exists a unique equilibrium, which is characterized by the following
functions:
χˆ (µkt) ≡ χˆi (µkt) =
σq
σµt
(µkt − µekt) + µq, (13)
wˆ (ln qt) =
ψσq
ασµ∞
E
£
yt|χˆ−1 (ln qt) , ln qt
¤
1 + ψσqασµ∞
, (14)
where E [yt|µkt, ln qt] = exp
³
logA+ αµkt +
α2σ2kt
2
+ ψ ln qt
´
and χˆ−1 (ln qt) ≡ σµtσq
¡
ln qt − µq
¢
+
µekt. Moreover, the expected profits of the firm are
πˆe (µkt) =
E [yt|µkt, χˆ (µkt)]
1 + ψσqασµ∞
. (15)
This theorem shows that the levels of skill and expected profits are strictly in-
creasing functions of µkt and that the wage function is a strictly increasing function of
ln qt. Hence, the dynamics for skills, wages and expected profits follow the dynamics
of µkt. On the other hand, labor productivity, ln yt, is strictly increasing in ln k
o
t and
ln qt. Hence, the dynamics of labor productivity are influenced by the dynamics of
ln kot and µkt. To understand the dynamics of productivity, wages, skills and profits,
we analyze the dynamics of ln kot and µkt below.
Dynamics: Similarly to the analysis of the previous section, we can derive the
dynamics of ln kot by substituting equation (13) into equation (3) as follows:
ln kot+1 = lnB + φ ln k
o
t + γ
∙
σq
σµt
(µkt − µekt) + µq
¸
+ εt. (16)
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To derive the dynamics of µkt, we must describe the information structure of the
model. After the firm employs a worker, output is produced. From the realized
output, the firm knows eut (kot )
α. Hence, a firm uses a signal, st ≡ ln kot + u∗t , to
infer ln kot , where u
∗
t =
1
α
³
ut +
σ2u
2
´
is normally distributed with a mean of 0 and
a standard deviation of σuα . Because µkt+1 = E
£
ln kot+1|st, µkt,σkt
¤
and σkt+1 =q
V ar
£
ln kot+1|st, µkt,σkt
¤
, the dynamics of µkt and σkt can be written as follows:
µkt+1 = lnB + φE [ln k
o
t |st, µkt,σkt] + γ
∙
σq
σµt
(µkt − µekt) + µq
¸
− σ
2
ε
2
, (17)
σkt+1 =
q
φ2 (1− ht)σ2kt + σ2ε, (18)
where
E [ln kot |st, µkt,σkt] = (1− ht)µkt + htst = (1− ht)µkt + ht (ln kot + u∗t ) , (19)
ht =
³
ασkt
σu
´2
1 +
³
ασkt
σu
´2 . (20)
Equation (19) shows that E [ln kot |st, µkt,σkt] is a weighted average of the prior
belief, µkt, and new information st, where the variable ht is the weight on new infor-
mation. As shown in equation (20), ht is negatively related to σu. If the variance
of temporal shocks is large, it is difficult to infer ln kot from st and thus place a small
weight on st. In this way, the variable ht measures the reliability of new information.3
Because σkt is the same in all firms, equation (18) shows that σkt+1 is also the same in
all firms. Similarly, because µkt and st are normally distributed, equation (17) shows
that µkt+1 is also normally distributed. Hence, the normality of the distribution
3In fact, ht can be also rewritten as follows:
ht = 1−
E [V ar [ln kot |st, µkt,σkt]]
σ2kt
.
This equation shows that ht would be larger if the average conditional variance were smaller relative
to the prior variance. It measures the accuracy of information, as previously used by Takii (2003,
2007), as a tractable measure of prediction ability.
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is preserved. The following mean and standard deviation of the belief in the next
period can be derived:
µekt+1 = lnB + φµ
e
kt + γµq −
σ2ε
2
, (21)
σµt+1 =
sµ
φ+
γσq
σµt
¶2
σ2µt + φ
2htσ2kt. (22)
The derivation of equation (22) is given in Appendix 1. Furthermore, by substituting
equations (19) and (21) into equations (16) and (17), we can also rewrite the dynamics
of ln kot and µkt as follows:
ln kot+1 − µekt+1 = φ (ln kot − µekt) +
γσq
σµt
(µkt − µekt) + ε∗t , (23)
µkt+1 − µekt+1 = φht (ln kot − µekt) +
∙
φ (1− ht) +
γσq
σµt
¸
(µkt − µekt) + φhtu∗t ,(24)
where ε∗t = εt+
σ2ε
2
is normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation
of σε.
Equation (23) shows the dynamics of ln kot . The first term of equation (23) is
influenced by technological persistence, φ. That is, if organization capital is above
average, the fraction φ of this relative advantage is carried over to the next period. On
the other hand, the second term is influenced by positive assignment. If organization
capital is believed to be above average, the firm attracts skilled workers that help the
firm accumulate further organization capital.
Equation (24) shows the dynamics of µkt. The first term captures how new infor-
mation influences the dynamics of the belief. Managers know that the fraction φ of
current organization capital affects the next period’s organization capital. However,
current organization capital is not observable and must be inferred from current out-
put. High output can be the result of either a large temporal shock or a high level
of organization capital. Because managers put a weight ht on new information, the
fraction φht of current organization capital is believed to be translated into the next
period’s level. New information incorporates noise. Hence, the φht portion of u∗t
20
also influences the posterior belief. This effect is captured by the third term, φhtu∗t ,
in equation (24).
The second term of equation (24) captures the effect of the prior belief on the
posterior belief. There are two separate effects. Because there is assignment be-
tween the prior belief and worker quality, the higher the level of organization capital
is believed to be, a priori, the higher is the quality of workers that the firm can
employ. Given that skilled workers help the firm to accumulate organization capital,
organization capital in the next period is believed to be high. This assignment effect
is captured by γσqσµt in the second term. On the other hand, because output provides
only noisy information about organization capital, a weight of 1 − ht is placed on
the prior belief. Because the fraction φ of current organization capital is translated
into organization capital for the next period, the fraction φ (1− ht) of the prior belief
influences the posterior. Overall, the fraction φ (1− ht) + γσqσµt of the prior belief
influences the posterior.
The equations (23) and (24) provide some intuition about the dynamics of ln kot
and µkt. First, the interpretation of equation (23) is that ln k
o
t exhibits reversion to
the belief µkt and the speed of the reversion is influenced by the constant parameter
φ. Hence, assignment does not influence the persistence of ln kot unless it affects µkt.
Second, given equation (24), the smaller is ht, the less is µkt subjected to two types
of shock, ε∗t and u
∗
t . Hence, the ranking of µkt is less likely to change. Because there
is assignment between µkt and ln qt, fewer changes in the rankings imply that µkt
becomes more persistent. That is, the noisier is the information, the more persistent
is the belief.
More importantly, equation (24) implies that the current belief, µkt, can be influ-
enced by sequences of real organization capital, {ln kos}t−1s=0. Because current beliefs
influence the next period’s actual levels of organization capital according to equa-
tion (23), past sequences of actual organization capital can influence future values.
It is shown later that this mechanism can explain why higher order lags matter for
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productivity dynamics.
To confirm these arguments, we first show that this economy converges to the
stationary distribution. Then, we analyze the dynamics of organization capital in an
aggregate economy that reaches the stationary distribution.
Proposition 6 The aggregate economy converges to a unique stationary distribu-
tion.
µe∞ =
lnB + γµq −
σ2ε
2
1− φ
σµ∞ =
φγσq +
q
(γσq)
2 +
¡
1− φ2
¢
φ2h∞σ2k∞¡
1− φ2
¢
σ2k∞ =
α2σ2ε −
¡
1− φ2
¢
σ2u +
q£
α2σ2ε −
¡
1− φ2
¢
σ2u
¤2
+ 4α2σ2εσ2u
2α2
h∞ =
³
ασk∞
σ2u
´2
1 +
³
ασk∞
σ2u
´2
Moreover, the dynamics of an individual firm in the stationary distribution are de-
scribed by the following vector autoregression (VAR):
kt+1 =Mkt + ξt, (25)
where
M =
⎡
⎣ φ,
γσq
σµ∞
φh∞, φ (1− h∞) + γσqσµ∞
⎤
⎦ , kt =
⎡
⎣ D ln k
o
t
Dµkt
⎤
⎦ , ξt =
⎡
⎣ ε
∗
t
φh∞u∗t
⎤
⎦
and D ln kot = ln k
o
t − µek∞ and Dµkt = µkt − µek∞.
Because the stationary distribution is unique and globally stable, the economy
converges to the stationary distribution in the long run. We investigate the properties
of equation (25) and discuss what influences the persistence of organization capital.
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Persistence when σu =∞: It is instructive to start with an extreme case, in which
σu =∞. In this case, information is too noisy and the firm can learn nothing about
the level of organization capital. Hence, h∞ = 0 and the firm only puts weight on
its prior belief. Therefore, its belief never changes. By substituting σu = ∞ and
h∞ = 0 into equations (18), (22), (23) and (24), the following proposition is easily
derived. It shows that the movement of organization capital reverts to this constant
belief.
Proposition 7 Suppose that σ2u =∞. Then, the dynamics of the economy are given
by
µe∞ =
lnB + γµq −
σ2ε
2
1− φ , σµ∞ =
γσq
1− φ , σ
2
k∞ =
σ2ε
1− φ2
and
ln kot+1 = φ ln k
o
t + (1− φ)µkt + ε∗t , µkt+1 = µkt.
Because the firm cannot learn about its own organization capital, the firm never
changes its own belief. Hence, the belief is constant. Because assignment is based on
this belief, the firm that is believed to have a high level of organization capital attracts
good workers and maintains its position. Moreover, as actual organization capital is
subjected to shocks, the movement of organization capital temporally deviates from
the firm’s own belief. However, the level of organization capital remains the same
on average because of the constant belief.
Persistence when σu ∈ (0,∞), σε ∈ (0,∞) and φ ∈ (0, 1). Let us examine a more
general case. First, we analyze the stability of equation (25). Then, we analyze what
influences persistence. The following lemma provides the conditions for stability.
Lemma 8 Let λ1 and λ2 denote the eigenvalues of the matrix M. Then, equation
(25) is covariance stationary if λ1 = φ+
γσq
σµ∞
< 1 and λ2 = φ (1− h∞) < 1.
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Note that λ2 is less than unity. This means that stability is guaranteed if λ1 < 1.
The eigenvalue λ1corresponds to the persistence parameter of the previous section. It
consists of assumed persistence, φ, and the assignment effect, γσqσµ∞ . Hence, similarly
to the analysis of the previous section, if the assignment effect is not too strong, the
dynamics eventually converge to the mean.
Clearly, γσqσµ∞ and h∞ are endogenous variables. Thus, there are more fundamental
conditions for stability. The following lemma describes the relationship between the
endogenous variables, h∞ and
γσq
σµ∞
, and the exogenous variables, σuασε and
γσq
σε
.
Lemma 9 4Suppose that φ ∈ (0, 1), σuασε ∈ (0,∞) and
γσq
σε
∈ (0,∞). There exists a
function η (·) and Σ (·, ·) such that
h∞ = η
µ
σu
ασε
¶
∈ (0, 1) ,
where η0
³
σu
ασε
´
< 0, lim σu
ασε
→0 η
³
σu
ασε
´
= 1 and lim σu
ασε
→∞ η
³
σu
ασε
´
= 0, and
γσq
σµ∞
= Σ
µ
γσq
σε
, h∞
¶
∈ (0, 1− φ) , (29)
where Σ1
³
γσq
σε
, h∞
´
> 0, Σ2
³
γσq
σε
, h∞
´
< 0, limγσq
σε
→0Σ
³
γσq
σε
, h∞
´
= 0, limγσq
σε
→∞Σ
³
γσq
σε
, h∞
´
=
1− φ, limh∞→1Σ
³
γσq
σε
, h∞
´
∈ (0, 1− φ) and limh∞→0Σ
³
γσq
σε
, h∞
´
= 1− φ.
4Explicit solutions for η (·) and Σ (·, ·) in the Lemma 9 can be derived. Lemma 9 describes
results based on the following explicit solutions. Technical parts of the derivation are in Appendix
1.
η
µ
σu
ασε
¶
=
³
ασk∞
σu
´2
1 +
³
ασk∞
σu
´2 , where (26)
µ
ασk∞
σu
¶2
=
³
σu
ασε
´−2
−
¡
1− φ2
¢
+
s∙³
σu
ασε
´−2
−
¡
1− φ2
¢¸2
+ 4
³
σu
ασε
´−2
2
, (27)
and
Σ
µ
γσq
σε
, h∞
¶
=
¡
1− φ2
¢
φ+
r
1 + (1−φ
2)φ2h∞
1−φ2+φ2h∞
³
γσq
σε
´−2 . (28)
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The first part of this lemma shows that h∞ and σuασε have a one-to-one relation-
ship. Hence, in the steady state, without loss of generality, h∞ can be treated as an
exogenous parameter.
The parameter σuασε represents the standard deviation of noise relative to that of
shocks on the accumulation of organization capital . If the standard deviation of a
noise term is relatively large, firms cannot learn much and h∞ is small. If the noise
term has a relatively small variance, the firm can learn a lot and h∞ is large.
The second part of the lemma shows that for a given h∞ and φ,
γσq
σµ∞
and γσqσε
exhibit a one-to-one relationship. As explained in the previous section, if γσqσε is
large, the top organization derives the greatest benefit from a positive assortative
assignment. Hence, the dynamics exhibit more persistence.
More interestingly, γσqσµ∞ is decreasing in h∞. When information is noisier, rational
agents rely more on their prior beliefs to make inferences about the current level of
organization capital. Therefore, the posterior and prior beliefs are similar. Hence,
µkt is more persistent. Because the dynamics of actual organization capital exhibit
reversion to the firm’s own belief, noisy information makes actual organization capital
more persistent.
Note that the properties of the function Σ (·, ·) imply that when h∞ converges to
0, the persistence parameter, λ1, converges to 1. This means that when σuασε is large,
the dynamics can be approximated by the previous results, with σu =∞.
Note also that equation (29) implies that λ1 = φ+
γσq
σµ∞
< 1. Hence, the following
proposition can be stated.
Proposition 10 Suppose that φ ∈ (0, 1), and that σuασε and
γσq
σε
are finite. Equation
(25) is covariance stationary.
The two eigenvalues, λ1 and λ2, are important determinants of the persistence
of the stochastic process. Let ρln kj denote the autocorrelation between current
organization capital and organization capital j periods before. In addition, let ρµj
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denote the autocorrelation between a belief about current organization capital and
a belief about organization capital j periods before: ρln kj ≡
E[D ln kotD ln kot−j]
V ar(D ln kot )
, ρµj ≡
E[DµktDµkt−j]
σ2µ∞
. The following proposition derives the autocorrelation of ln kt and µkt.
The proof is established in Appendix 1.
Proposition 11 The autocorrelations of ln kot and µkt are functions of λ1 and λ2
ρln kj = (1− ω)λ
j
1 + ωλ
j
2, ρµj = λ
j
1,
where ω =
γσq
σµ∞
¡
1− λ21
¢
(λ1 − λ2)
¡
φ2h∞ + 1− λ21
¢ .
The above proposition states that the autocorrelation of organization capital can
be expressed as a weighted average of λj1 and λ
j
2; the autocorrelation of the belief
is λj1. Note that λ1 > λ2. Hence, the following corollary results from the above
proposition.
Corollary 12 Suppose that γσqσε > 0. The autocorrelation of the belief about a firm’s
organization capital exceeds that of its actual organization capital: ρµj > ρln kj, ∀j.
The corollary states that the belief is more persistent than is the organization cap-
ital itself. Because idiosyncratic shocks directly influence the realization of random
variables, the variance of the realized random variable is generally larger than the
variance of the conditional expectation. The same logic applies in this case. Given
that the belief is less volatile than is actual organization capital, the autocorrelation
of the belief exceeds the actual value. This corollary confirms this intuition.
Next, we show how the parameters γσqσε and h∞(or
σu
ασε
) affect the autocorrelations.
The proof is established in Appendix 1.
Proposition 13 1) There exist j∗ and j∗∗ such that for all j ≥ j∗, dρln kj
d
γσq
σε
> 0 and
for all j ≥ j∗∗, dρln kj
dh∞
< 0. 2) For all j,
dρµj
d
γσq
σε
> 0 and
dρµj
dh∞
< 0.
This proposition implies that an increase in γσqσε and a decrease in h∞ increase the
autocorrelation about the belief. The same changes can increase the autocorrelation
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of organization capital after enough time has passed. Because there is positive
assignment between the belief and skills, there are direct effects on the autocorrelation
about the belief. However, both influence the autocorrelation of actual organization
capital because future actual organization capital is influenced by the firm’s current
belief. Actual organization capital can temporally deviate from the belief. However,
as time passes, an increase in the persistence of the belief dominates the temporal
disturbance and increases the persistence of organization capital itself.
4 Empirical Examination
In this section, we derive empirically testable equations and examine the validity
of our model. We show that the predictions of our model are broadly supported
by the data. The estimated parameters are used to identify the structure of our
models: technological persistence, φ; the effect of assignment on persistence, γσqσµ∞ ;
and a measure of the accuracy of information, h∞. These structural parameters are
inputs into the simulation exercises of the next section.
Because we cannot observe kot , we must translate the results from the previous
section into dynamics for observable variables. One such variable is output, yt.
Given that the number of workers is assumed to be unity, we estimate yt by using
labor productivity. The dynamics of a firm’s labor productivity relative to the
industry and year average and the expected relative productivity in the steady state
are derived from equation (25), as follows:
D ln yt+1 = b1D ln yt + b2E [D ln yt|µkt] + vt, (30)
E
£
D ln yt+1|µkt+1
¤
= b3D ln yt + b4E [D ln yt|µkt] , (31)
where D ln yt = ln yt − E [ln y], b1 = φ + ψσqασµ∞φh∞, b2 =
γσq
σµ∞
− ψσqασµ∞φh∞, b3 =
φh∞ +
ψσq
ασµ∞
φh∞, b4 = b1 + b2 − b3 and vt = α
¡
ε∗t − φu∗t + u∗t+1
¢
. The derivations of
equations (30) and (31) are given in Appendix 1.
27
Before showing how to estimate these parameters, it is instructive to discuss how
the estimated parameters are related to φ, γσqσµ∞ and h∞. Suppose that
ψσq
ασµ∞
is known.
The parameters φ, γσqσµ∞ and φh∞ can be identified from the following three equations:
φ = b1 −
ψσq
ασµ∞
φh∞,
γσq
σµ∞
= b2 +
ψσq
ασµ∞
φh∞, φh∞ =
b3
1 + ψσqασµ∞
.
These equations imply that φ, γσqσµ∞ and h∞ are primarily related to b1, b2 and b3,
respectively.
To clarify the intuition behind these relationships, note that equation (30) can be
written as
D ln yt+1 = φD ln yt +
γσq
σµ∞
E [D ln yt|µkt] +
ψσq
ασµ∞
φh∞ [D ln yt −E [D ln yt|µkt]] + vt.
As in equation (23), the coefficient on D ln yt represents technological persistence and
the coefficient on E [D ln yt|µkt] represents the effect of assignment on persistence.
That is, because the fraction φ of current organization capital is transformed into
next period’s organization capital, the fraction φ of current labor productivity is
linked to labor productivity in the next period. On the other hand, because belief
in a high level of organization capital attracts skillful workers, the coefficient on
E
£
D ln yt−1|µkt−1
¤
represents the effect of assignment on organization capital in the
next period. The third term does not appear in equation (23). It arises because of
a prediction error. When realized output exceeds expected output, people update
their beliefs. The updated belief attracts better workers in the next period, which
raises output. Hence, if the effects of prediction error are removed, the coefficients
on D ln yt and E [D ln yt|µkt] in equation (30) separately identify φ and γσqσµ∞ .
Note that we can separately identify φ and γσqσµ∞ even if h∞ = 1. When h∞ =
1, a firm knows the exact level of current organization capital. However, future
organization capital remains unknown because it is influenced by shocks. Hence, a
firm’s employment decision must be based on its beliefs, rather than on real values.
That is, our model can separate γσqσµ∞ from φ not because of noisy information, but
because it distinguishes the effects of firms’ decisions from those of firms’ capabilities.
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The prediction error is clearly influenced by the accuracy of information. In our
regression analysis, the parameter b3 provides useful information about h∞. Note
that
b1 − b3 = φ (1− h∞) . (32)
This expression shows that the difference between b1 and b3 provides information
about h∞. In equation (30), vt and D ln yt are correlated because E [u∗t |D ln yt] 6= 0.
Because measured productivity is influenced not only by the level of organization
capital, but also by current temporal shocks, observed productivity contains informa-
tion about current shocks. When rational agents predict future productivity, they
efficiently extract this information from current productivity. Hence, b3 deviates
from the fundamental parameter b1. When the variation of u∗t is a large component
of the variation in measured productivity, measured productivity is influenced more
by u∗t and less by ln k
o
t . Hence, measured productivity is useful for predicting u
∗
t , but
not for predicting ln kot . Therefore, h∞ is small and the difference between b1 and b3
is large.
Estimation Method 1: To implement the procedure discussed above, we must
estimate E [D ln yt|µkt] from the data. We propose two methods for doing this.
Because each strategy has its own strengths and weaknesses, it is hoped that the
strategies complement each other.
The first method applies the following proposition, which is proven by equations
(14) and (15). Although the dynamics of organization capital are not influenced by
the assumption that organization capital is accumulated through learning by doing,
equations (14) and (15) are affected by this assumption. Therefore, the following
useful proposition represents a benefit of assuming that there is learning by doing.
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Proposition 14 Perceived relative productivity is equal to relative wages and ex-
pected relative profits per worker.
E [D ln yt|µkt] = D ln wˆ (χˆ (µkt)) = D ln πˆe (µkt) ,
whereD ln wˆ (χˆ (µkt)) = ln wˆ (χˆ (µkt))−E [ln wˆ (χˆ (µkt))] andD ln πˆe (µkt) = ln πˆe (µkt)−
E [ln πˆe (µkt)].
Proposition 14 states that perceived relative productivity can be estimated by
using relative wages. Hence, the following testable equation is derived from equations
(30) and (31):
D ln yt = θ1D ln yt−1 + θ2D ln yt−2 + θ3D lnwt−2 + vt−1, (33)
where θ1 = b1, θ2 = b2b3 and θ3 = b2 (b1 + b2 − b3) > 0. By using the estimated value
of θ1, θ2 and θ3, we can identify b1, b2 and b3, which allows us to estimate φ, h∞ and
γσq
σµ∞
.
Equation (33) shows that after controlling for the first and second lags of relative
productivity, the second lag of relative wages must have a positive impact on current
relative productivity. Given that skilled workers equip firms with better firm-specific
knowledge, the theory predicts that there is a positive association between past wages
and current productivity.
One econometric issue exists. Because vt−1 contains u∗t−1, it is correlated with
D ln yt−1. Hence, we need an instrument for this variable. Proposition 14 provides a
suitable instrument. Because the firmmakes employment decisions without observing
realized output, relative wages, D lnwt−1 ≡ lnwt−1 − E [lnw], are not influenced by
the realization of the noise term, u∗t−1, but are correlated with D ln yt−1 because of
positive assignment. Hence, D lnwt−1 can be used as the instrument.
Estimation Method 2: The next estimation method is more complex. However, it
allows us to examine a different prediction of our theory. This is that the belief, which
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is constructed from sequences of past relative productivity, influences future relative
productivity. Furthermore, to apply this alternative method, we need not assume
that there is learning by doing. Hence, even if top managers’ skills are important
elements of organization capital, this estimation method can be used to identify
parameters. To construct E [D ln yt|µkt] from the data, we derive the following
regression equation from equation (31):
D ln yt = b3
t−1X
i=0
(b4)
iDyt−1−i + b
t
4E [D ln y0|µk0] +$t, (34)
where $t = D ln yt − E [D ln yt|µk]. Note that $t is not correlated with D ln yt−1−i
for all i ≥ 0 and E [D ln y0|µk0].
As already discussed, the parameters b1 and b3 differ because E [vt|D ln yt] 6= 0.
Hence, to separate b1 from b3, we apply ordinary least squares (OLS) to equation (34)
and use an instrumental variables (IV) approach to estimate equation (30). The IV
estimate provides a consistent estimator of the parameter b1 and the OLS estimate
provides a biased estimator of b1, which is b3. Hence, the difference between the
IV estimates and the OLS estimates indicates the extent to which labor productivity
provides information about the error term and identifies h∞. We use this technique
in applying the second estimation procedure discussed below.
Assume that there is a proxy for E [D ln y0|µk0]. First, we choose an arbi-
trary value of b4, and construct
Pt−1
i=0 (b4)
iDyt−1−i and (b4)
tE [D ln y0|µk0] from the
data. Second, equation (34) is estimated under the constraint that the coefficient of
(b4)
tE [D ln y0|µk0] is 1. This yields bˆ3, where bˆ3 is the estimated value of b3. Third,
using bˆ3 and b4, we estimate E [D ln yt|µkt] by bˆ3
Pt−1
i=0 (b4)
iDyt−1−i+b
t
4E [D ln y0|µk0].
Fourth, using the estimated value of E [D ln yt|µkt], we estimate equation (30) by us-
ing the IV regression. We use D ln yt−1 and D lnwt as instruments for D ln yt and
E [D ln yt|µkt]. We need an additional instrument for E [D ln yt|µkt] because bˆ3 con-
tains a measurement error. This IV estimation procedure yields bˆ1 and bˆ2, where bˆ1
and bˆ2 are the estimated values of b1 and b2. Fifth, because there is a regulatory
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relationship, according to which b4 = b1 + b2 − b3, we replace b4 by bˆ1 + bˆ2 − bˆ3 and
repeat the same procedure until the estimated b4 converges to the assumed b4.
Data: We use COMPUSTAT industry annual data from 1970 to 2004 for estimation.
COMPUSTAT provides data on an unbalanced panel of publicly traded firms in
the U.S. It contains information from balance sheets, and information on incomes,
cash flows and financial variables. The variables value added per worker and the
average wage rate are constructed for each firm and each year. Details of our data
construction procedure and summary statistics on the constructed variables are given
in Appendix 1.
We estimate D ln yft and D lnwft by ln yft −
Pmt
j ln yft
mt
and lnwft −
Pmt
j lnwft
mt
,
where yft is value added divided by the number of workers and labor expenses per
worker in the fth firm in year t, respectively, and mt is the number of firms in the
corresponding four-digit industry in year t. We estimate each firm’s initial prior
belief, E [D ln y0|µk0], from the average value of D ln yft over the five consecutive
years following the firm’s initial appearance in COMPUSTAT after 1970. Therefore,
the following regression is estimated by using data for 1975—2004.
Results: First, in Table 2, we report the regression results from the first estimation
method.
Because only few companies report labor and related expenses in COMPUSTAT,
we estimate labor costs for companies that do not report this information. (The
estimation method is described in Appendix 1.) To investigate the potential bias
arising from the use of this estimation method, we also report regression results based
on the sample of companies that report labor and related expenses. The “Small
Sample” in Table 2 includes only companies that report labor and related expenses.
The “Large Sample” includes companies whose labor costs we have estimated.
All coefficients in Table 2 are significant and positive, which is consistent with our
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The dependent variable is D ln yt.
Small Sample Small Sample Large Sample Large Sample
D ln yt−1 0.708∗∗ 0.696∗∗ 0.708∗∗ 0.671∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.008) (0.008)
D ln yt−2 0.120∗∗ 0.132∗∗ 0.158∗∗ 0.084∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.009) (0.008)
D lnwt−2 0.116∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.087∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.006) (0.006)
D ln kt 0.038∗∗ 0.106∗∗
(0.007) (0.002)
# of observations 3113 3113 30135 20119
Table 2: Estimation Method 1
The variables D ln yt, D lnwt and D ln kt are relative labor productivity, relative
wage payments and the relative capital—labor ratio, respectively. The “Small
Sample” includes only companies that report labor and related expenses. The
“Large Sample” also includes companies whose labor costs we have estimated. The
variable D lnwt−1 is used as the instrument for this regression. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. ∗∗ denotes significance at the 0.5 percent level.
theoretical predictions. Moreover, the results do not depend on the sample size.
More interestingly, two-year lagged relative wage payments have a positive impact
on current relative productivity even after conditioning the first and second lags of
relative productivity. The elasticity of two-year lagged relative wage payments is
0.12 in the small sample and 0.04 in the large sample. The coefficient is smaller
in the large sample. However, the results from both samples are significant and
demonstrate the quantitative effect. The results support the hypothesis that skilled
workers improve a firm’s assets.
In this regression, we implicitly assume that there are no adjustment costs of
investment in physical capital. Given this assumption, physical capital can be derived
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as a function of organization capital. Organization capital not only directly increases
labor productivity, it also increases the physical capital stock, which in turn raises
labor productivity. Because we are interested in the total effect of organization
capital on labor productivity, we ignore the physical capital stock.
However, if adjustment costs of investment in physical capital are important,
a high current level of labor productivity can partially be explained by the initial
physical capital stock per worker. The omission of physical capital might have
biased our estimates. To investigate this possibility, we add relative physical capital
per worker, D ln kt. We estimate D ln kt by using ln kft −
Pmt
f ln kft
mt
, where kft is the
initial capital stock per worker in the fth firm in year t.
The inclusion of D ln kt hardly changes the coefficients in the small sample, but
raises the elasticity of D lnwt−2 and lowers that of D ln yt−2 in the large sample. This
indicates that adjustment costs of investment might have biased our results in the
large sample. This is a potential problem. However, this minimal bias is unlikely
to affect our simulation results. We discuss this point later.
We report the regression results obtained by using the second estimation method
in Tables 3 and 4. The initial value of b4 is chosen to be 0.5. The result is not
sensitive to this choice. The results in these tables are based on the estimated b4
matching the assumed b4. Table 3 reports the results from the regression equation
(34). Table 4 reports the results from the regression equation (30).
Table 3 shows that b3 (the coefficient on
Pt−1
i=0 (b4)
iD ln yt−1−i) is 0.64 in the small
sample and 0.72 in the large sample. The large sample produces a slightly larger
value of b3. To check whether the constrained regression produces a bias, we also
ran an unconstrained regression. This regression yields a similar value of b3. This
suggests that our estimates are not sensitive to the constraint.
The unconstrained regression also reveals an interesting feature of the data: the
weighted initial prior has a persistent effect on labor productivity. This means that
the effect of initial values declines over time, but does not fade out altogether. The
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theory predicts a coefficient on the weighted initial prior of 1, but this is not supported
by data. However, the coefficients are not far from 1. In particular, the coefficient
in the small sample is close to 1, 0.93. These results indicate that the model is a
useful first-order approximation of the data.
As already discussed, if adjustment costs of investment in physical capital are
important, our results might be biased. Hence, we also include D ln kt in our regres-
sions. This does not materially change the coefficients of the regressions. Hence,
our results are robust in this respect.
Table 4 shows that, after controlling for current relative productivity, the con-
structed belief about relative productivity continues to influence relative productivity
in the next year. Note that E [D ln yt|µkt] is constructed from past observations. Our
regression results are consistent with the hypothesis that people learn about a firm’s
capacity from its past performance and form a belief that influences the employment
of skilled workers and future performance.
Table 4 shows that b1 (the coefficient on D ln yt) is 0.84 in the small sample and
0.72 in the large sample. Given that b3 is 0.64 in the small sample and 0.72 in the
large sample, b1 exceeds b3 in the small sample, but both are similar in the large
sample. Hence, equation (32) implies that h∞ < 1 in the small sample, while h∞
= 1 in the large sample. That is, according to the results from the large sample,
labor productivity is useful for predicting organization capital.
Adding relative physical capital stock per worker hardly changes the coefficients
in the small sample, but causes the coefficient of E [D ln yt|µkt] to decrease in the
large sample. This indicates that the large-sample regression results might overstate
the effects of assignment if adjustment costs of investment in physical capital are
important. However, as is discussed later, this potential problem is unlikely to affect
our simulation results.
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The dependent variable is D ln yt.
Small Small Small Large Large Large
Const Unconst Const Const Unconst ConstPt−1
i=0 (b4)
iD ln yt−1−i 0.637∗∗ 0.639∗∗ 0.627∗∗ 0.715∗∗ 0.719∗∗ 0.667∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
bt4E [D ln y0|µk0] 1 0.931∗∗ 1 1 0.847∗∗ 1
(0.026) (0.006)
D ln kt 0.074∗∗ 0.082∗∗
(0.007) (0.002)
# of observations 3645 3645 3638 32211 32211 32114
Table 3: Estimation Method 2 — the First Stage
The dependent variable is D ln yt+1.
Small Small Large Large
D ln yt 0.838∗∗ 0.798∗∗ 0.716∗∗ 0.757∗∗
(0.041) (0.040) (0.013) (0.013)
E [D ln yt|µkt] 0.090∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.211∗∗ 0.103∗∗
(0.043) (0.042) (0.014) (0.013)
D ln kt+1 0.049∗∗ 0.085∗∗
(0.008) (0.003)
# of observations 2772 2771 23019 23012
Table 4: Estimation Method 2 — the Second Stage
We report regression results in which the estimated b4 matches the assumed b4 in
two tables. “Small” refers to the small sample, which includes only companies that
report labor and related expenses. “Large” refers to the large sample that includes
companies whose labor costs we have estimated. “Const” denotes the constrained
regression and “Unconst” denotes the unconstrained regression. Table 3 reports
OLS results, and Table 4 reports IV results. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ∗ denotes significance at the 5 percent level. ∗∗ denotes significance at
the 0.5 percent level.
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Small Sample Large Sample
E[wt]
E[yt]
0.429 0.608
Table 5: Labor Share
E[wt]
E[yt]
=
PI
i
PT
t
"Pmii
f
wfitPmii
f
yfit
#
IT
, where wfit and yfit are the wage payments and labor
productivity of the fth firm in the ith industry in year t, mit is the number of firms
operating in the ith industry in year t, I is the number of industries and T is the
number of years. “Small Sample” includes only the companies that report labor
and related expenses and “Large Sample” includes also companies for which we
have estimated labor costs.
5 Simulation Results
In this section, we report our estimates of φ, h and γσqσµ∞ . Using the estimated
parameters, we simulate our model and examine the extent to which assignment and
the noisiness of information affect the persistence of relative productivity, relative
wages and relative profits per worker.
Calibration of ψσqασµ∞ : To identify the parameters, we need to know the value of
ψσq
ασµ∞
.
For this purpose, we use a calibration technique. The wage function (14) implies
that ψσqασµ∞ can be estimated from
E[wt]
E[yt]
, and we estimate E[wt]
E[yt]
from
PI
i
PT
t
"Pmit
f
wfitPmit
f
yfit
#
IT
,
where wfit and yfit are the wage payments and labor productivity of the fth firm in
the ith industry in year t, mit is the number of firms operating in the ith industry
in year t, I is the number of industries and T is the number of years.
Table 5 reports our estimate of E[wt]
E[yt]
. This is 0.43 in the small sample and 0.61 in
the large sample. Because E[wt]
E[yt]
approximates the labor share, the estimate of 0.43 is
fairly small. This may be because COMPUSTAT only includes publicly traded firms,
which are relatively capital intensive and above average in size. In particular, because
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only relatively large firms in COMPUSTAT report labor and related expenses, “Small
Sample” contains only fairly large firms. In 2000, the average capital stock of firms
not reporting labor and related expenses was 421 million dollars, whereas that of
firms reporting labor and related expenses was 787 million dollars.
Note that our estimated values are similar to those obtained by previous studies
based on COMPUSTAT data. Dhawan and Gerdes (1997) report an estimated labor
share from COMPUSTAT of 0.3. Summary statistics in Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson
and Hitt (2002) indicate a labor share for their selected sample from COMPUSTAT
of 0.53.
Although our estimated E[wt]
E[yt]
varies between samples, fortunately our simulation
results are not particularly sensitive to these variations. Below, we use our estimates
to estimate φ, h∞ and
γσq
σµ∞
.
Estimated Structural Parameters: The results from our regression analysis yield
the following parameters of interest: ψσqασµ∞ , φ, h∞ and
γσq
σµ∞
. Table 6 reports the
results.
Our estimates generally differ between the small and large samples. The large
difference in ψσqασµ∞ arises because of different estimated values of
E[wt]
E[yt]
. The value of
ψσq
ασµ∞
measures the relative importance of worker quality to production. Hence, if
ψσq
ασµ∞
is large, a firm’s productivity is affected more by assignment. This partially
explains why γσqσµ∞ is relatively large and φ is relatively small in the large sample.
Similarly, our estimates of h∞ are also sensitive to the sample size.5 Output is useful
for predicting organization capital in the large sample, but not in the small sample.
While different sample sizes yield large differences in the estimated parameters,
different estimation methods produce similar results. In particular, the results in
5Because h∞ cannot exceed unity, if the estimated value of h∞ is greater than 1 we set h∞ = 1
for the purpose of simulation.
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Small Sample Small Sample Large Sample Large Sample
Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 1 Estimation 2
ψσq
ασµ∞
0.751 0.751 1.549 1.549
φ 0.499 0.565 0.279 0.282
h∞ 0.556 0.644 1 0.993
γσq
σµ∞
0.456 0.363 0.646 0.645
λ1 = φ+
γσq
σµ∞
0.955 0.928 0.925 0.927
Table 6: The Estimated Structural Parameters
ψσq
ασµ∞
measures the relative contribution of skills to current labor productivity. φ
measures technological persistence. h∞ measures the accuracy of the information
contained in realized labor productivity for predicting the level of organization
capital. γσqσµ∞ measures the importance of assignment for persistence. “Small
Sample” includes only companies that report labor and related expenses. “Large
Sample” also includes companies for which labor costs are estimated.
the large sample are almost identical. The robustness of the estimates to different
estimation methods suggests that the results are reliable.
More importantly, although regressions from different samples produce different
values, the estimated persistence parameters, λ1 = φ +
γσq
σµ∞
, are remarkably stable.
They range from 0.93 to 0.96. Note that Proposition 11 suggests that λ1 is the
most important parameter for the persistence of organization capital. It is shown
later that λ1 is also the most important parameter for the persistence of relative
productivity, relative wages and expected relative profits. The remarkable stability
of the persistence parameter explains why our simulation results are not particularly
sensitive to variations in sample size and estimation method.
Persistence of Productivity, Wages and Profits per Workers: To understand
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the effects of assignment on persistence, we calculate autocorrelations for produc-
tivity and expected productivity. Let us define the autocorrelations as ρln yj ≡
E[D ln ytD ln yt−j ]
V ar(ln yt)
and ρE[ln y|µ]j ≡
E[E[D ln yt|µt]E[D ln yt−j |µt−j]]
V ar(E[ln yt|µt]) . The following proposi-
tion, which is proved in Appendix 1, generates the theoretical prediction.
Proposition 15 The autocorrelations of relative productivity and expected relative
productivity are
ρln yj =
φh∞
³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´
λj−11
h
φh∞
³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´
λ1 + 1− λ21
i
³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´2
(φh∞)
2 + 1− λ21
, ρE[ln y|µ]j = λ
j
1,
where λ1 = φ+
γσq
σµ∞
and j ≥ 1.
Note that the predicted autocorrelations can be calculated by using the estimated
structural parameters, ψσqασµ∞ , φ, h∞ and
γσq
σµ∞
. Proposition 15 shows that λ1 is the
most important determinant of these autocorrelations. Given that there is a stable
estimate of λ1, we do not expect the predicted autocorrelations to depend greatly on
the sample size and estimation method. This expectation is confirmed below.
We compare the simulated correlations with the correlations observed in the data.
Proposition 14 states that perceived relative productivity is equal to the relative wage,
which is also equal to expected relative profits per worker. Hence, for wages and
expected profits per worker, we can use the autocorrelations of expected relative
productivity to compare the simulated correlations with the observed ones. Note
that, in this model, autocorrelations are equivalent to correlations between current
relative values and relative values from j periods previously. Hence, we estimate the
observed correlations by using
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t
PI
i
Pmit
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Pmit
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t
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Pmit
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Pmit
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Pmit
f lnxfi(t−j)
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i2 ,
(35)
where xfit represents either the labor productivity, labor expenses per worker or the
operating income per worker of the fth firm in the ith industry in year t, mit is the
number of firms operating in the ith industry in year t, I is the number of industries
and T is the number of years.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 summarize the results of our simulations. Figure 1 compares the
simulated correlation for relative productivity with the one estimated from the data.
As already discussed, the results are similar despite differences in sample size and
estimation method. All predicted correlations fit the data quite well. In particular,
the simulation results in the large sample are remarkably good. All results indicate
that the model can quantitatively account for the observed persistence of productivity
differences.
Figure 2 conducts the same exercises for the relative wage. All results suggest
that the model’s predictions are consistent with the data. Hence, the results in
Figure 1 are unlikely to be the result of coincidence. Our model can also explain the
persistent differences in wage payments.
Figure 3 compares the predicted correlation for expected relative profits per worker
with the correlation of relative profits per worker. Although the predicted correlation
is much larger than the observed correlation, this result is expected. Our theory ex-
plains the correlation for expected relative profits per worker, but not the one for real
relative profit per worker. Real profits per worker are affected by unpredictable idio-
syncratic shocks. Hence, this correlation is expected to be smaller. This reasoning
is consistent with the pattern observed in Figure 3.
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The correlation between current relative productivity and past relative productivity
(small sample)
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The correlation between current relative productivity and past relative productivity
 (large sample)
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Figure 1:
42
The correlation between current relative wages and past relative wages
(small sample)
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The correlation between current relative wages and past relative wages
(large sample)
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Figure 2:
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The correlation between current relative profits per worker and past relative profits per worker
(small sample)
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The correlation between current relative profits per worker and past relative profits per worker
(large sample)
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Let us conduct a counterfactual experiment. We first ask “What would happen if
people were homogenous and, therefore, there were no assignments in the economy?”
This experiment can be done by assuming that σq = 0 and the other parameters are
constant. The assumption of σq = 0 implies a zero labor share,
ψσq
ασµ∞
= 0, and implies
that there is no assignment effect, γσqσµ∞ = 0. Figures 4 and 5 report the results of
this experiment.
Figure 4 shows that, if σq = 0, the autocorrelations for relative productivity
diminish to about 0 after five years. This result does not depend on either the
sample sizes or the estimation method. All results show that relative temporal
advantages disappear quickly if there are no benefits from positive assignment.
This point is confirmed by Figure 5. It shows that if σq = 0, the autocorrelations
of perceived relative productivity (which is equivalent to relative wages6 and expected
relative profits per worker) become 0 after between four and six years. This result is
not affected by either sample size or estimation methods. This means that positive
assignment accounts for much of the observed persistence in wage payments and
profits.
We also ask “What would happen if h∞ = 1?”. Recently, many economists have
recognized the importance of intangible assets to firms and have tried to estimate
them [e.g., Hall (2001)]. This exercise may provide valuable information on how
better estimation of organization capital might affect the persistence of variables.
Table 6 shows that labor productivity is quite informative in the large sample.
This means that the noisiness of information is not the main source of persistence
in the large sample. Hence, we conduct this exercise only for the small sample and
investigate whether the small sample confirms the findings from the large sample.
6There is a caution for the interpretation of Figure 5. Equation (14) says that if σq = 0, wages
must be 0 for all firms. Hence, the relative wage is always 0. In order to maintain a link between
the relative wage and expected relative productivity, σq has to be slightly larger than 0. Hence,
when we discuss the persistence of the relative wages, the results in Figure 5 have to be interpreted
as an approximation.
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The autocorrelation without skill variation : productivity
(small sample)
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The autocorrelation without skill variation: productivity
(large sample)
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The autocorrelation without skill variation : wages and expected profits per worker
(small sample)
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 The autocorrelation without skill variation: wages and expected profits per worker
(large sample)
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The autocorrelation without noise: productivity
(small sample)
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The autocorrelation without noise: wages and expected profits per worker
(small sample)
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When h∞ changes, Lemma 9 shows that
γσq
σµ∞
changes through equation (29), which
in turn influences ψσqασµ∞ . This is because
ψσq
ασµ∞
= ψαγ
γσq
σµ∞
. These combined effects are
reported in Figure 6. This shows that an improvement in information causes only
slight changes in the persistence of productivity, even in a small sample.
Figure 6 also illustrates an interesting finding. When h∞ = 1, the autocorrela-
tions of relative wages and expected relative profits are smaller than those from the
benchmark model; that of relative productivity is larger in the short run and smaller
in the long run. When h∞ = 1, because beliefs are frequently updated the autocorre-
lations of relative wages and expected relative profits per worker are small. Although
the same effect influences the autocorrelation of relative productivity, there is an ad-
ditional effect. When h∞ = 1, σu = 0. Hence, labor productivity is not affected by
temporal shocks and the autocorrelation may be larger. Although temporal shocks
negatively affect the persistence of relative productivity in the short run, their effect
is dominated by that of beliefs in the long run.
In summary, these exercises consistently suggest that positive assortative assign-
ment accounts for much of the observed persistence of a firm’s relative advantages
(disadvantages), whereas the noisiness of information plays a relatively minor role.
Positive Correlation Between Relative Productivity and Relative Wages:
Our model can predict the correlation between relative productivity and relative
wages, ρln y lnw, where ρln y lnw ≡
E[D ln ytD lnwt]√
V ar(D ln yt)V ar(D lnwt)
. The following proposition is
proved in Appendix 1.
Proposition 16 The correlation between D ln yt and D lnwt can be simulated by
ρln y lnw =
³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´
φh∞r³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´2
φ2h2∞ + 1− λ21
.
This proposition states that the correlation can be predicted by using our esti-
mated parameters. We compare the simulated correlations with the observed ones.
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Small Small Large Large
Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 1 Estimation 2
Data 0.774 0.774 0.842 0.842
Model 0.853 0.863 0.879 0.886
Model without Skill Variation 0.305 0.404 0.278 0.280
Model without Noise 0.923 0.919 0.879 0.886
Table 7: The Correlation Between Relative Productivity and Relative Wages
“Small” includes only companies that report labor and related expenses. “Large”
also includes companies for which we have estimated labor costs.
The observed correlation between relative productivity and relative wages is estimated
by using a method similar to that used to estimate equation (35).
Table 7 reports the results. The model predicts a slightly higher correlation than
the observed one: the model predicts a correlation of between 0.85 and 0.89, whereas
the one recorded by the data is between 0.77 and 0.84. However, 0.77 and 0.84 are
still high. Hence, the high predicted correlation reasonably captures the feature of
the actual correlation.
There is an explanation of why the correlations predicted by the model exceed
the observed correlations. To prove Proposition 16, we assume that organization
capital is accumulated through learning by doing. However, some workers may be
intentionally employed to develop organization capital. As Appendix 2 suggests, if
a firm’s maximization problem takes into account the accumulation of organization
capital, the wage is related not only to current expected productivity, but also to
the market value of a firm. Hence, the predicted correlations would be lower than
those reported in Table 7.
Similarly to the previous argument, if we assume that σq = 0 the correlation is
between 0.28 and 0.4.7. This means that the observed positive correlation between
7When σq = 0, the wage is 0. Hence, the result obtained from the model that does not
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relative productivity and the relative wage largely arises because of positive assor-
tative assignment between organization capital and the quality of workers. On the
other hand, if h∞ = 1 the correlation is slightly larger. This indicates that the
noisiness of information contributes little to reducing the correlation.
In summary, according to the theory, a large assignment effect and the generation
of fairly accurate information for inferring organization capital from output combine
to explain the high observed correlation between labor productivity and wages.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a theory that accounts for persistent differences in pro-
ductivity, wages, skill mixes and profits between firms. Firms with a high level of
organization capital attract skilled workers, who increase organization capital further.
This positive feedback brings about persistent differences in these variables. It is
also shown that history can be important for predicting future persistence because
organization capital is unobservable. Our model is consistent with empirical evi-
dence. Our simulation results show that positive assortative assignment explains a
large proportion of observed persistence.
Some points are worth discussing. We defined organization capital as all the in-
tangible assets embodied in an organization. As explained by Prescott and Visscher
(1980), a source of organization capital is firm-specific human capital. Firm-specific
human capital may raise an issue not explicitly considered in this paper. Follow-
ing Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) and Samaniego (2006), in this paper, we assumed
that firms receive benefits from organization capital. However, because firm-specific
human capital is valuable only to a particular firm, it is difficult to determine who
benefits from it.
Fortunately, the dynamics of organization capital are not affected by the explicit
incorporate skill variations, in Table 7, can be interpreted as the correlation when σq ≈ 0.
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incorporation of firm-specific human capital. In the context of this paper, organiza-
tion capital is essentially vintage human capital, which is influenced by the history
of skilled workers in a firm. Hence, one could consider a model in which a sequence
of senior workers develops the organization capital of the firm and in which there
is assignment between organization capital and worker skills. Although this would
alter the wage function derived in the paper, it would not materially affect persis-
tence. This is because profits and wages would continue to depend on organization
capital, and the dynamics of organization capital would continue to be influenced by
assignment. Because incorporating an internal labor market raises several separate
issues and complicates the model, it would represent an interesting extension of our
model.
We were unable to address questions about the dynamics of firm size because
our assignment model requires that the number of workers is fixed. However, it
would be possible to extend the model in order to analyze firm size. Assuming
that assignment between top managers and organization capital determines the total
factor productivity (TFP) of a firm, other factors such as physical assets and the
number of workers can be derived as functions of TFP. That is, the larger is TFP,
the higher are the levels of capital and labor. This approach can be used to generate
theoretical predictions about the dynamics of firm size. In this case, assuming that
there is learning by doing is questionable and, thus, one would rely on the results in
Appendix 2. This interesting extension is left for future research.
Finally, it would be interesting to extend the model to incorporate entry and exit
by firms. We ignored entry and exit by firms to focus on effects on the persistence of
variables. Incorporating entry and exit would inevitably introduce nonlinearity and
make it difficult to find an analytical solution. Hence, one would use computational
exercises for this analysis. Because equation (12) implies that a firm’s position, rel-
ative to the top, is important in an assignment model, one would expect that the
cut-off points at the bottom of distribution would not greatly affect the theoretical
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prediction of our model. Nonetheless, it would be interesting to examine how as-
signment affects entry and exit by firms. We plan to investigate this issue in future
research.
7 Appendix 1
The Derivation of Equation (22): Because E [µktE [(ln kot − µkt) |µkt]] = 0, the
covariance of µkt and ln k
o
t − µkt is 0. Hence,
σ2µt+1 =
µ
φ+
γσq
σµt
¶2
σ2µt + (φht)
2 V ar (ln kot − µkt) +
µ
φht
α
¶2
σ2u
=
µ
φ+
γσq
σµt
¶2
σ2µt + (φht)
2E
£
E
£
(ln kot − µkt)
2 |µkt
¤¤
+
µ
φht
α
¶2
σ2u
=
µ
φ+
γσq
σµt
¶2
σ2µt + (φht)
2 σ2kt +
µ
φht
α
¶2
σ2u
=
µ
φ+
γσq
σµt
¶2
σ2µt +
µ
φht
α
¶2 α2σ2kt
ht
=
µ
φ+
γσq
σµt
¶2
σ2µt + φ
2htσ2kt.
The Derivation of Equations (28), (26) and (27): The derivations of equations
(26) and (27) follow from Proposition 6. Hence, we only discuss the derivation of
equation (28). From Proposition 6, it follows that
γσq
σµ∞
=
¡
1− φ2
¢
φ+
r
1 +
¡
1− φ2
¢
φ2h∞
³
σk∞
γσq
´2 . (36)
Note that equation (18) implies σ2k∞ = φ
2 (1− ht)σ2k∞ + σ2ε in the steady state.
Hence, it follows that
σ2k∞ =
σ2ε
1− φ2 (1− h∞)
. (37)
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Substituting equation (37) into equation (36) yields equation (28).
The Proof of Proposition 11: Because equation (25) implies that
kt =
jX
i=1
Mi−1ξt−i +Mjkt−j,
hence, we can show that
E
£
ktk
0
t−j
¤
= E
""
jX
i=1
Mi−1ξt−i +Mjkt−j
#
k0t−j
#
=MjE
£
kt−jk
0
t−j
¤
. (38)
Note that Lemma 8 shows that the two eigenvalues of the matrixM are λ1 = φ+
γσq
σµ∞
and λ2 = φ (1− h∞). Hence, we can easily calculate the following corresponding
eigenvectors:
⎡
⎣ 1
1
⎤
⎦ z1, ∀z1 ∈ R for λ1,
⎡
⎣ −
γσq
σµ∞
φh∞
⎤
⎦ z2,∀z2 ∈ R for λ2.
Define two matrices, Λ and Z:
Λ =
⎡
⎣ λ1, 0
0, λ2
⎤
⎦ , Z =
⎡
⎣ z1, −
γσq
σµ∞
z2
z1, φh∞z2
⎤
⎦ ,∀z1, z2 ∈ R. (39)
Then, the matrix M can be decomposed into Λ and Z: M = ZΛZ−1. Hence, it
follows from equation (38) that
E
£
ktk
0
t−j
¤
= ZΛjZ−1E
£
kt−jk
0
t−j
¤
,
where ZΛjZ−1 = 1
φh∞ +
γσq
σµ∞
⎡
⎣ φh∞λ
j
1 +
γσq
σµ∞
λj2,
γσq
σµ∞
¡
λj1 − λ
j
2
¢
φh∞
¡
λj1 − λ
j
2
¢
, γσqσµ∞λ
j
1 + φh∞λ
j
2
⎤
⎦ . (40)
Because we can easily calculate
E
£
kt−jk
0
t−j
¤
=
⎡
⎣ σ
2
µ∞ + σ
2
k∞, σ
2
µ∞
σ2µ∞, σ
2
µ∞
⎤
⎦ ,
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an autocovariance matrix can be calculated as follows:
E
£
ktk
0
t−j
¤
=
⎡
⎢⎣
λj1σ
2
µ∞ +
∙
φh∞λ
j
1+
γσq
σµ∞ λ
j
2
φh∞+
γσq
σµ∞
¸
σ2k∞, λ
j
1σ
2
µ∞
φh∞
φh∞+
γσq
σµ∞
¡
λj1 − λ
j
2
¢
σ2k∞ + λ
j
1σ
2
µ∞, λ
j
1σ
2
µ∞
⎤
⎥⎦ .
By using the first row and first column element E
£
ktk
0
t−j
¤
and the second row and
second column element of E
£
ktk
0
t−j
¤
, the following autocorrelations of ln kot and µkt
are derived:
ρkj = (1− ω)λj1 + ωλ
j
2, ρµj = λ
j
1,
ω ≡
γσq
σµ∞
(λ1 − λ2)
µ
1 +
³
σµ∞
σk∞
´2¶ .
Note that equation (22) implies σ2µ∞ = (φσµ∞ + γσq)
2+φ2h∞σ2k∞ in the steady state.
This means thatµ
σµ∞
γσq
¶2
= λ21
µ
σµ∞
γσq
¶2
+ φ2h∞
µ
σk∞
σµ∞
¶2µσµ∞
γσq
¶2
.
Hence, it follows from this equation thatµ
σµ∞
σk∞
¶2
=
φ2h∞
1− λ21
. (41)
Substituting this equation into the definition of ω, we have
ω =
γσq
σµ∞
¡
1− λ21
¢
(λ1 − λ2)
¡
1− λ21 + φ2h∞
¢ .
The Proof of Proposition 13: The impacts on ρµj are clear. Hence, we only
derive the effects on ρlnkj.
dρln kj
d
³
γσq
σε
´ = λj−11
"
j (1− ω)−
Ã
1−
µ
λ2
λ1
¶j!
λ1
dω
d γσqσµ∞
#
Σ1
µ
γσq
σε
, h∞
¶
> λj−11
"
j (1− ω)−
¯¯¯¯
¯λ1 dωd γσqσµ∞
¯¯¯¯
¯
#
Σ1
µ
γσq
σε
, h∞
¶
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Hence, there exists a j∗ such that dρln kj
d( γσqσε )
> 0,∀j ≥ j∗. Similarly
dρ lnkj
dh∞
= λj−11
"
j (1− ω)Σ2
µ
γσq
σε
, h∞
¶
− λ1
Ã
dω
d γσqσµ∞
Σ2
µ
γσq
σε
, h∞
¶
+
dω
dh∞
!#
+λj−12
(Ã
dω
d γσqσµ∞
Σ2
µ
γσq
σε
, h∞
¶
+
dω
dh∞
!
λ2 − jωφ
)
.
Hence, there exists a j∗∗ such that dρkj
dh∞
< 0,∀j ≥ j∗∗.
The Derivation of Equations (30) and (31): Substituting equation (13) into
equation (9) yields, in the steady state,
D ln yt = α (ln kot − µekt) +
ψσq
σµ∞
Dµkt + ut +
σ2u
2
, (42)
E [D ln yt|µkt] =
µ
α+
ψσq
σµ∞
¶
Dµkt. (43)
We define the vectors yt and ζt and a matrix G such that
yt =
⎡
⎣ D ln yt
E [D ln yt|µkt]
⎤
⎦ , G =
⎡
⎣ α,
ψσq
σµ∞
0, α+ ψσqσµ∞
⎤
⎦ , ζt =
⎡
⎣ ut +
σ2u
2
0
⎤
⎦ . (44)
Then,
yt = Gkt + ζt.
Combining this equation and equation (25) yields
yt+1 = GMG
−1yt +Gξt + ζt+1 −GMG−1ζt. (45)
The results follow immediately because it is easy to derive
GMG−1 = M+
ψ
α
σq
σµ∞
φh∞J, where J=
⎡
⎣ 1 −1
1 −1
⎤
⎦ , (46)
Gξt + ζt+1 −GMG−1ζt =
⎡
⎣ α
³
εt +
σ2ε
2
´
− φ
³
ut +
σ2u
2
´
+ ut+1 +
σ2u
2
0
⎤
⎦ .
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The Proof of Proposition 15: We define vectors yt and ζt and a matrix G in the
same way as we defined equation (44). Using equation (45), we find
yt =
j−1X
i=1
¡
GMG−1
¢i−1
vt−i +
¡
GMG−1
¢j−1
yt−(j−1),
where vt−i = Gξt + ζt+1 −GMG−1ζt. Hence the covariance matrix is
E
¡
yty
T
t−j
¢
=
¡
GMG−1
¢j−1
E
¡
yt−(j−1)y
T
t−j
¢
=
¡
GMG−1
¢j−1
E
¡
yt+1y
T
t
¢
.
We define matrices Λ and Z in the same way as we defined equation (39). Then, as
stated in the proof of Proposition 11,M = ZΛZ−1. Hence,¡
GMG−1
¢j−1
=
³
GZΛZ−1G−1
´j−1
= ZyΛj−1Z−1y ,
where
Zy = GZ =
⎡
⎣ z
∗
1 ,
³
γσq
σµ∞
− ψσqασµ∞φh∞
´
z∗2
z∗1 , −
³
φh∞ +
ψσq
ασµ∞
φh∞
´
z∗2
⎤
⎦ ∀z∗1 , z∗2 ∈ R.
Hence, we can show that
¡
GMG−1
¢j−1
= ZΛj−1Z−1 +
¡
λj−11 − λ
j−1
2
¢
φh∞ +
γσq
σµ∞
ψσq
ασµ∞
φh∞J, (47)
where ZΛjZ−1 is defined in equation (40) and J is defined in equation (46). Next,
we calculate E
£
yt+1y
T
t
¤
. Because yt+1 = GMG−1yt + vt, E
£
yt+1y
T
t
¤
can be de-
composed into E
¡
yty
T
t
¢
and E
¡
vty
T
t
¢
.
E
¡
yt+1y
T
t
¢
= GMG−1E
¡
yty
T
t
¢
+E
¡
vty
T
t
¢
Because E
¡
yty
T
t
¢
and E
¡
vty
T
t
¢
are calculated as
E
¡
yty
T
t
¢
=
⎡
⎣
³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´2
α2σ2µ∞ + α
2σ2k∞ + σ
2
u,
³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´2
α2σ2µ∞³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´2
α2σ2µ∞,
³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´2
α2σ2µ∞
⎤
⎦ ,(48)
E
¡
vty
T
t
¢
=
⎡
⎣ −φσ
2
u, 0
0, 0
⎤
⎦ , (49)
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we can derive
E
¡
yt+1y
T
t
¢
= α2
µ
1 +
ψσq
ασµ∞
¶⎡
⎣
³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´
λ1σ2µ∞ + φσ
2
k∞,
³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´
λ1σ2µ∞³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´
λ1σ2µ∞ + φσ
2
k∞,
³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´
λ1σ2µ∞
⎤
⎦ .
(50)
Hence, equations (47) and (50) can be used to show that
E
¡
yty
T
t−j
¢
= α2σ2k∞
µ
1 +
ψσq
ασµ∞
¶
λj−11
⎡
⎣
³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´
λ1
³
σµ∞
σk∞
´2
+ φ,
³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´
λ1
³
σµ∞
σk∞
´2³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´
λ1
³
σµ∞
σk∞
´2
+ φ,
³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´
λ1
³
σµ∞
σk∞
´2
⎤
⎦ .
Using the first row and first column of this covariance matrix, we can derive the
autocorrelation between ln yt and ln yt−j,
ρln yj =
³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´
λj−11
∙³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´
λ1
³
σµ∞
σk∞
´2
+ φ
¸
³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´2 ³
σµ∞
σk∞
´2
+ 1 +
³
σu
ασk∞
´2 .
Note that equation (41) implies
³
σµ∞
σk∞
´2
= φ
2h∞
1−λ21
and that equation (26) implies³
σu
ασk∞
´2
= 1−h∞
h∞
. Hence, ρln yj can be rewritten as
ρln yj =
φh∞
³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´
λj−11
h
φh∞
³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´
λ1 + 1− λ21
i
³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´2
(φh∞)
2 + 1− λ21
.
Similarly, using the second row and second column of the covariance matrix, we can
derive the autocorrelation between E [ln yt|µkt] and E
£
ln yt−j|µkt−j
¤
,
ρE[ln y|µk]j = λ
j
1.
The Proof of Proposition 16: Proposition 14 implies ln wˆ (χˆ (µkt))−E [ln wˆ (χˆ (µkt))] =
E [ln yt|µkt]−E [ln yt]. Hence,
ρln y lnw =
Cov [[ln yt −E [ln yt]]E [ln yt|µkt]−E [ln yt]]
σyσE[y|s]
.
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Using equation (48), it is easy to show that
ρln y lnw =
³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´
σµ∞
σk∞r³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´2 ³
σµ∞
σk∞
´2
+ 1 +
³
σu
ασk∞
´2 .
Note that equation (41) implies
³
σµ∞
σk∞
´2
= φ
2h∞
1−λ21
and that equation (26) implies³
σu
ασk∞
´2
= 1−h∞
h∞
. Hence, ρyw can be rewritten as
ρln y lnw =
³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´
φh∞r³
1 + ψσqασµ∞
´2
φ2h2∞ + 1− λ21
.
Data Appendix: ((#X)ft implies COMPUSTAT number X of fth firm in year t
and (#X)fit implies COMPUSTAT number X of fth firm in ith industry in year t.)
• Selection of data: We used industry annual data from 1970 to 2004 from COM-
PUSTAT. However, because we constructed initial priors for each firm by using
the initial five annual observations in COMPUSTAT, our regression is based on
data for 1975—2004. We deleted observations for which either the estimated
wage or value added was negative and deleted those for which the labor share
exceeded unity. This was because such observations are not consistent with the
model’s assumptions. Because we are interested in deviations from the indus-
try average, we retain industries that have at least five firms throughout the
years for which data are available. Industries are classified based on four-digit
industry codes.
• Total expenses are defined as (#41)ft + (#189)ft, where (#41)ft is the cost of
goods sold and (#189)ft measures administrative, selling and general expenses.
• Labor expenses: If a firm reports labor and related expenses, (#42)ft, that
includes employee benefits, we use this as our measure of labor expenses. The
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small sample comprises these firms. Otherwise, we estimate labor expenses
as follows. First, if a firm reports labor and related expenses that exclude
employee benefits, we replace labor expenses by
⎡
⎣
P
f∈Yt(#42)ft/(#29)ft
nY tP
f∈Xt(#42)ft/(#29)ft
nXt
⎤
⎦ (#42)ft ,∀t,
where (#29)ft is the number of workers in the fth firm in year t and Yt is the
set of firms that includes employee benefits for year t, Xt is the set of firms that
exclude employee benefits for year t, nY t is the number of firms in set Yt and
nXt is the number of firms in set Xt. This is an estimate of labor and related
expenses that includes employee benefits. Second, if a firm does not report
labor and related expenses, we estimate these expenses by
⎡
⎣
P
f∈Zit (#42)fit /
h
(#41)fit + (#189)fit
i
nZit
⎤
⎦
h
(#41)fit + (#189)fit
i
, ∀t, i,
where Zit is the set of firms that report labor and related expenses in the
ith industry in year t and nZit is the number of firms in set Zit. Note that
(#41)fit+ (#189)fit is defined as total expenses. This is our estimate of labor
expenses for firms in the large sample.
• yft: Value added divided by the number of employees (#29)ft. Value added is
measured as sales (#12)ft minus the value of materials, which is total expenses
minus labor expenses.
• wft: Labor expenses divided by the number of employees (#29)ft.
• πft: Operating income (#13)ft divided by the number of employees (#29)ft.
• kft: Total net value of property and plant and equipment at the end of the
previous year (#8)ft−1 divided by the number of employees (#29)ft. Hence,
we approximate the initial capital stock by using the value at the end of the
previous year.
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yit wit πit kit
1990 Mean 82.9 34.8 48.1 32.9
Std. Dev. 120 14.0 110 29.9
Median 67.6 31.4 36.9 27.9
# of Obs 142 142 142 141
2000 Mean 145 52.2 92.8 47.1
Std. Dev. 39.8 14.0 31.6 22.7
Median 139 49.1 84.2 41.5
# of Obs 86 86 86 85
Table 8: Summary Statistics for the Small Sample
yit wit πit kit
1990 Mean 77.2 33.8 43.4 103
Std. Dev. 366 45.7 360 338
Median 48.0 28.4 14.4 25.4
# of Obs 1371 1371 1371 1353
2000 Mean 153 59.1 94.0 221
Std. Dev. 533 169 488 1141
Median 75.3 41.2 26.5 32.7
# of Obs 1561 1561 1558 1524
Table 9: Summary Statistics for the Large Sample
The nominal value is reported. Dollar figures are in thousands.
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8 Appendix 2
In this appendix, we show that even if a firm takes into account the dynamics of or-
ganization capital for its maximization problem, the dynamics of organization capital
do not change. However, the wage function and the value function are affected.
We define a recursive positive assortative equilibrium with unobserved organiza-
tion capital. To formally define the equilibrium, we distinguish prevailing uncertainty
about ln kot , σ
a
kt from a firm’s uncertainty about ln k
o
t , σkt, which are, however, equal
in equilibrium. Let xt = (µekt,σµt,σ
a
kt)
T denote the vector of these aggregate state
variables. The firm’s problem can be rewritten as
V ∗ (µkt,σkt : xt) = max
ln qt
⎧
⎨
⎩
E [yt|µkt,σ2kt, ln qt]− w∗ (ln qt : xt)
+β
R
V ∗
¡
µkt+1,σkt+1 : xt+1
¢
dΓs (st|µkt,σkt)
⎫
⎬
⎭ , (51)
s.t.E
£
yt|µkt,σ2kt, ln qt
¤
= exp
µ
lnA+ αµkt +
α2σ2kt
2
+ ψ ln qt
¶
,
µkt+1 = lnB + φ [(1− ht)µkt + htst] + γ ln qt −
σ2ε
2
,
σkt+1 =
q
φ2 (1− ht)σ2kt + σ2ε,
µekt+1 = f (xt) ,σµt+1 = g (xt) ,σ
a
kt+1 = m (xt) ,
where Γs (st|µkt,σkt) is a conditional distribution function of a signal st given µkt
and σkt, and functions f (·), g (·) and m (·) represent firms’ expectations about the
transition of the aggregate state variables. Our candidate equilibrium is a positive
assortative equilibrium. Hence, similarly to the static problem, the policy function
must satisfy
χ∗ (µkt,σkt : xt) =
σq
σµt
[µkt − µekt] + µq.
Given this policy function, the dynamics of µekt+1 and σµt+1 are
µekt+1 = lnB + φµ
e
kt + γµq −
σ2ε
2
,
σµt+1 =
q
(φσµt + γσq)
2 + φ2ht (σakt)
2.
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Hence, a recursive positive assortative equilibrium with unobserved organization
capital is defined as follows.
Definition 17 A recursive positive assortative equilibrium with unobserved organiza-
tion capital comprises values of χ∗ (µkt,σkt : xt), V
∗ (µkt,σkt : xt), w
∗ (qt : xt), f (xt),
g (xt) and m (xt) that satisfy the following conditions.
1. An individual firm solves its maximization problem (51).
2. The labor market is cleared:
χ∗ (µkt,σkt : xt) =
σq
σµt
[µkt − µekt] + µq.
3. Expectations are rational:
f (xt) = lnB + φµekt + γµq −
σ2ε
2
, (52)
g (xt) =
q
(φσµt + γσq)
2 + φ2ht (σakt)
2, (53)
m (xt) =
q
φ2 (1− ht) (σakt)
2 + σ2ε, (54)
where
ht =
³
ασakt
σu
´2
1 +
³
ασakt
σu
´2 ,σakt = σ2kt.
Because σakt = σkt in equilibrium, σkt is used subsequently to denote the aggregate
state variable. Note that if this equilibrium exists, the dynamics of kot and µkt are the
same as those presented in the main text. Hence, our main results are unaffected.
Because the labor- market clearing condition and rational expectations assumption
determine the functions χ∗ (µkt,σkt : xt), f (xt), g (xt) and m (xt), we need to find a
value function and a wage function that are consistent with the definition of equilib-
rium. The next theorem derives the value function and the wage function.
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Theorem 18 Suppose that φ ∈ [0, 1), α ∈ (0,∞), ψ ∈ (0,∞), γ ∈ (0,∞), σε ∈
[0,∞), σq ∈ [0,∞) and σu ∈ [0,∞]. There exists a unique recursive positive as-
sortative equilibrium with unobserved organization capital. In equilibrium, the value
function and the wage function are
V ∗ (µkt,σkt : xt) =
∞X
i=0
Πis=1
βφ
φ+ γσqσµt+s−1
E [yt+i|µkt,σkt]
1 + ψσqασµt+i
, (55)
w∗ (ln qt : xt) =
ψσq
ασµt
E [yt|µkt,σkt]
1 + ψσqασµt
|µkt=σµtσq (ln qt−µq)+µekt (56)
+
β γσqσµt
φ+ γσqσµt
Z
V
¡
µkt+1,σkt+1 : xt+1
¢
dΓs (st|µkt,σkt) |µkt=σµtσq (ln qt−µq)+µekt ,
where Π0s=1
βφ
φ+
γσq
σµt+s−1
= 1 and
E [yt+i|µkt,σkt] = exp
⎡
⎢⎣
lnA+ ψ
³
µq −
σq
σµt+i
µekt+i
´
+
α2σ2kt+i
2
+³
α+ ψσqσµt+i
´
E
£
µkt+i|µkt,σkt
¤
+
µ
α+
ψσq
σµt+i
¶2
2
V ar
£
µkt+i|µkt,σkt
¤
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
E
£
µkt+i|µkt,σ2kt
¤
= µekt+i +Π
i
τ=1
µ
φ+
γσq
σµt+i−τ
¶
(µkt − µekt) ,
V ar
£
µkt+i|µkt,σ2kt
¤
=
iX
τ=1
Πτ−1s=1
µ
φ+
γσq
σµt+i−s
¶2
φ2ht+i−τσ2kt+i−τ ,
and
µekt+i =
1− φi
1− φ
µ
lnB + γµq −
σ2ε
2
¶
+ φi−1µekt,
σµt+i = gi (xt) ≡ g
³¡
µekt+i−1, g
i−1 (xt) ,m
i−1 (xt)
¢T´
,
σ2kt+i = m
i (xt) ≡ m
³¡
µekt+i−1, g
i−1 (xt) ,m
i−1 (xt)
¢T´
,
and
g1 (xt) = g (xt) =
q
(φσµt + γσq)
2 + φ2ht (σakt)
2,
m1 (xt) = m (xt) =
q
φ2 (1− hat ) (σakt)
2 + σ2ε.
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Proof. Consider a mapping, T
TV ∗ = max
ln qt
⎧
⎨
⎩
E [yt|µkt,σkt, ln qt]− w∗ (ln qt : xt)
+β
R
V ∗
¡
µkt+1,σkt+1 : xt+1
¢
dΓs (st|µkt,σkt)
⎫
⎬
⎭ ,
E [yt|µkt,σkt, ln qt] = exp
µ
logA+ ψ ln qt + αµkt +
α2σ2kt
2
¶
,
µkt+1 = lnB + φ [(1− ht)µkt + htst] + γ ln qt −
σ2ε
2
.
Suppose that the value function and the wage function are represented by equations
(55) and (56). Define
MPQ (µkt,σkt, ln qt) =
dE [yt|µkt,σkt, ln qt]
d ln qt
+β
Z
dV ∗
¡
µkt+1,σkt+1 : xt+1
¢
d ln qt
dΓs (st|µkt,σkt) .
Then, we can derive
w∗0 (ln qt : xt) =MPQ
µ
σµt
σq
¡
ln qt − µq
¢
+ µekt,σkt, ln qt
¶
.
Hence, when a firm is endowed with µkt = χ
−1 (ln qt,σkt : xt) =
σµt
σq
¡
ln qt − µq
¢
+µekt,
it can equate the marginal cost of ln qt, w0 (ln qt : xt) to the marginal benefit of ln qt,
MPQ (µkt,σkt, ln qt) by choosing ln qt. It is also easy to check that
w∗00 (ln qt : xt) >
∂MPQ (µkt,σkt, ln qt)
∂ ln qt
|µkt=σµtσq (ln qt−µq)+µekt .
Hence, the objective function of the firm for which µkt = χ
−1 (ln qt,σkt : xt) is strictly
concave and ln qt is a unique optimal decision. This decision is consistent with a
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policy function of χ (µkt,σkt : xt). Hence,
TV ∗ = E [yt|µkt,σkt]− w∗
µ
σq
σµt
[µkt − µekt] + µq : xt
¶
+β
Z
V ∗
¡
µkt+1,σkt+1 : xt+1
¢
dΓs (st|µkt,σkt)
=
αE [yt|µkt,σkt]
α+ ψσqσµt
+
βφ
φ+ γσqσµt
Z
V ∗
¡
µkt+1,σkt+1 : xt+1
¢
dΓs (st|µkt,σkt)
=
αE [yt|µkt,σkt]
α+ ψσqσµt
+
βφ
φ+ γσqσµt
∞X
i=0
Πis=1
βφ
φ+ γσqσµt+s
αE [yt+1+i|µkt,σkt]
α+ ψσqσµt+1+i
=
αE [yt|µkt,σkt]
α+ ψσqσµt
+
∞X
j=1
Π
j
u=1
βφ
φ+ γσqσµt+u−1
αE [yt+j|µkt,σkt]
α+ ψσqσµt+j
=
∞X
j=0
Π
j
u=1
βφ
φ+ γσqσµt+u−1
αE [yt+j|µkt,σkt]
α+ ψσqσµt+j
.
Hence, TV ∗ = V ∗.
Finally, we show that
P∞
i=0Π
i
s=1
βφ
φ+
γσq
σµt+s−1
αE[yt+i|µkt,σkt]
α+
ψσq
σµt+i
is bounded. Because βφ
φ+
γσq
σµt+u−1
<
1 and Proposition 6 show that µekt+i, σkt+i and σµt+j converge to finite values, it is
enough to show that E
£
µkt+i|µkt,σkt
¤
and V ar
£
µkt+i|µkt,σkt
¤
converge to finite val-
ues. We define
Di = Π
i−1
x=0
µ
φ+
γσq
σµt+x
¶
.
Suppose that φ ∈ (0, 1), σu < ∞ and that σε ∈ (0,∞). Then, Proposition 8 shows
that limx→∞
³
φ+ γσqσµt+x
´
= φ+ γσqσµ∞ < 1. Hence, limi→∞Di → 0. This means that
E
£
µkt+i|µkt,σkt
¤
and V ar
£
µkt+i|µkt,σkt
¤
converge to finite values. Now suppose that
φ = 0, σu = ∞ or σε = 0. Then, V ar
£
µkt+i|µkt,σ2kt
¤
= 0. Note that if limi→∞Di
is bounded, limi→∞E
£
µkt+i|µkt,σkt
¤
is bounded. We need to prove that limi→∞Di
is bounded. Suppose that φ = 0; then, σµt+1 = γσq for all t. This means that
φ+ γσqσµt+x = 1 for all t. Hence, Di = 1. Suppose that σ
2
u =∞ or σ2ε = 0. Because
σµt = φσµt + σqγ, 1 = φ+
γσq
σµ∞
. Note that
σµt+x =
1− φx
1− φ σqγ + φ
xσµt.
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Hence,
Di = Π
i−1
x=0
(
φ+
γσq
1−φx
1−φ σqγ + φ
xσµt
)
= Πi−1x=0
⎧
⎨
⎩1 + (φ− 1)
⎡
⎣1− γσq
σqγ +
h
1−
³
φ+ σqγσµt
´i
σµtφ
x
⎤
⎦
⎫
⎬
⎭
= Πi−1x=0
⎧
⎨
⎩1−
(1− φ)
h
1−
³
φ+ σqγσµt
´i
1− φ+ σqγσµt
³
1
φx − 1
´
⎫
⎬
⎭ .
Note that for both 1 ≥ φ+ σqγσµt and 1 < φ+
σqγ
σµt
, the following condition is satisfied:
Πi−1x=0
⎧
⎨
⎩1−
(1− φ)
h
1−
³
φ+ σqγσµt
´i
1− φ+ σqγσµt
³
1
φx − 1
´
⎫
⎬
⎭ ≤ Π
i−1
x=0
⎧
⎨
⎩1−
(1− φ)
h
1−
³
φ+ σqγσµt
´i
1− φ+ (1− φ)
³
1
φx − 1
´
⎫
⎬
⎭ .
Hence, it can be shown that
Di ≤ Πi−1x=0
½
1− φx
∙
1−
µ
φ+
σqγ
σµt
¶¸¾
= exp
i−1X
x=0
log
½
1 + φx
∙µ
φ+
σqγ
σµt
¶
− 1
¸¾
≤ exp
i−1X
x=0
φx
∙µ
φ+
σqγ
σµt
¶
− 1
¸
= exp
1− φi
1− φ
∙µ
φ+
σqγ
σµt
¶
− 1
¸
.
The third inequality uses the fact that log (1 + g) is concave in g. This means that
lim
i→∞
Di ≤ exp
³
φ+ σqγσµt
´
− 1
1− φ .
Hence, Di is bounded.
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